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The New Deal created a separate and unequal credit market—high-interest, 
non-bank, installment lenders in black ghettos and low-cost, securitized, and 
revolving credit card market in the white suburbs. Organized protest against this 
racialized inequality was an essential but forgotten part of the civil rights movement. 
After protests and riots drew attention to the reality that the poor were paying more 
for essential consumer products than the wealthy, the nation’s policymakers began 
to pay attention. Congress held hearings and agencies, and academics issued reports 
examining the economic situation. These hearings led to new federal agencies and 
programs, executive actions, as well as several acts of legislation. These 
Congressional investigations and the theories and explanations emanating from 
policymakers and academics were the genesis of decades of legislation aimed at 
supporting minority banks and other institutions. The resulting policy framework is 
still in effect and includes: the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), the 
Community Development Financial Institution Act (CDFIA), as well as several key 
provisions and mandates regarding minority banks in banking legislation. In this 
Article, I will argue that the foundational theoretical premise of these laws and 
policies is flawed. Though policymakers and scholars accurately diagnosed the root 
causes of the disparate credit market, the solutions did not correspond with the 
problem and have therefore been ineffective. These laws and policies were not 
aimed to address the systemic causes of the disparity but only served to treat its 
symptoms. The misguided focus on small community banking, minority-owned 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395876
Clean Final Edit_Baradaran.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/18/19  8:43 PM 
102 U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:X 
banks, and mission-oriented institutions as a response to structural inequality has 
been the dominant framework in banking reform.  
In analyzing the varied, but theoretically consistent response to lending 
inequality, this Article also challenges a long-standing banking myth that “small 
community banking” or “microfinance” is the answer to poverty, specifically for 
marginalized communities. This idea was the foundational theory of the minority 
banking industry, the CRA, the CDFIA, and almost every legislative response to 
credit inequality for the past fifty years. The premise of these laws is that that 
marginalized communities, having been left out of the dominant banking industry, 
will pool their resources and collectively lift themselves out of poverty. As such, 
these laws are rooted in neoliberal and libertarian concepts of banking market even 
as they have been championed by progressive reformers and community activists. 
For most policymakers, activists, and scholars, the buzzword is “community 
empowerment” and they have legislated accordingly. In doing so, they have avoided 
addressing the root causes of the problem and have shifted the responsibility of a 
solution to the disenfranchised communities themselves instead of devising 
comprehensive federal policy solutions. This Article will trace the genealogy of this 
legislation and offer solutions that will address the root causes of this inequality. 
THE NEW DEAL FOR WHITE AMERICA 
The New Deal changed America’s legal and political landscape, but it also 
transformed the nation’s banking and credit markets. Banking reforms and 
regulations, proposed by progressives and populists for decades, finally passed into 
law with a defeated and shamed business sector. Southern democrats, populists, 
labor coalitions, and free silverites had been fighting “money trusts” and Wall Street 
power since the founding clash between Hamilton and Jefferson. Finally, the New 
Deal coalition, composed of a Southern Democrat bloc in the senate and FDR, 
overcame the banking lobby’s opposition to government intervention. The New 
Deal coalition wanted to prevent the outsized influence and financial heft of 
Northern metropolis banks. They advocated a mixed economy of banks working 
with federal government institutions to provide credit to small farmers and 
landowners. Thus, the banking and credit reforms passed during the New Deal were 
a significant progressive reordering of business regulation. Its centrally-controlled 
economic planning, Keynesian stimulus programs, and foundational social welfare 
infrastructure made the New Deal the closest that America came to democratic 
socialism.1  
Unfortunately, most of the significant New Deal policies were administered 
in such a way as to create categorical exclusion of blacks from government 
 
1. See also IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR  
TIME (2013). 
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subsidies.2 This combination of progressive banking reform and a regressive racial 
hierarchy resulted in a banking legislative framework that propelled post-war 
American prosperity through an exclusionary mortgage and consumer credit 
apparatus. Through executive action and Congressional legislation, a new legal 
framework emerged during the New Deal era. These included several credit and 
banking agencies and regulators including: the Home Owners Loan Corporation 
(HOLC), the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB), the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). These institutions worked 
together to promulgate the rapid and effective dissemination of low-cost credit to 
new homeowners. These agencies, combined with postwar economic growth, 
created a homeowning, capital-creating, and predominantly white middle-class. 
Having built the new middle-class on mortgage credit, these programs also 
exacerbated poverty in segregated black communities.3 The government-fueled 
mortgage markets created homeowning white suburbs and a tenant-dominated 
black urban centers.  
 
2. See IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 17, 51 (2005) (“[T]he 
wide array of significant and far-reaching public policies that were shaped and administered during the 
New Deal and the Fair Deal era of the 1930s and 1940s were crafted and administered in a deeply 
discriminatory manner.”); see also KATZNELSON, supra note 1.  
3. See LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK 51 (2013) 
(discussing how President Roosevelt and Congress could have made a different choice which would 
not have resulted in such stark inequality. For instance, Roosevelt could have channeled public funds 
towards building low-income housing and establishing much-needed infrastructure in urban-poor 
neighborhoods. He almost did just that. One of the most robust New Deal programs was the Public 
Works Administration (PWA), which was run by Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, a committed 
civil rights advocate and former president of the Chicago NAACP. The PWA was the federal 
government’s largest construction effort to date with a $6 billion budget used to build thousands of 
bridges and roads that put millions of Americans to work. But the PWA’s initial housing decision was 
to use funds to build homes and infrastructure in poverty-stricken areas, including inner-city ghettos. 
The PWA’s purpose was to provide a job-creating economic stimulus while offering a benefit to the 
public. Ickes believed that the Roosevelt administration should use the New Deal to address America’s 
urban poverty. He warned that if the slums were not rehabilitated, they would inhibit economic growth 
in America’s cities); see also ROBERT CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF 
NEW YORK 607–14 (1974) (discussing how investors were interested in revamping the single-family 
mortgage market, so the reforms followed this route. Unfortunately, these reforms worked directly 
against the urban poor. For example, the government used many PWA grants in major cities like New 
York and Chicago to route roads and bridges over and through the ghetto, a decision that favored 
bridge-and-tunnel commuters, neglected public transportation, and divided major thoroughfares in 
long-established communities); HYMAN, supra, at 51–53 (discussing how Ickes complained “that most 
of the projects that came before [the PWA] were conceived more for the speculative benefit of their 
promoters than for the advantage of the people who need modern housing at a low price.” The 
opposition believed that the PWA’s goal should be to get private investors involved by offering them 
a share of the profits. However, investors lacked interest in rebuilding inner cities, so the plan was 
scuttled); GAIL RADFORD, MODERN HOUSING IN AMERICA: POLICY STRUGGLES IN THE NEW DEAL 
ERA 85–110 (2008) (discussing how Ickes said that no less than “the future financial stability of many 
of our urban centers” depended on “the prompt reclamation of their slum areas.” By 1933, Ickes set 
aside $485 million to build low-cost apartment buildings across the country. Critics fiercely opposed 
this plan. They said that it was not the federal government’s responsibility to deal with urban housing 
problems).  
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Government documents and FHA manuals reveal that race became the 
primary determinant of mortgage eligibility. Thousands of FHA officials 
demarcated every neighborhood in the country by underwriting risk. Using 
standardized evaluation forms, officials from the FHA determined what homes the 
FHA would guarantee. The most important determination on each form was the 
percentage of “negro” or “foreign born” residents in each neighborhood as well as 
the likelihood of “infiltration” of each race.4 Race became a proxy for credit risk in 
government underwriting. These maps had four color categories based on perceived 
risk: A (green), B (blue), C (yellow), and D (red); green being the most desirable and 
red being the least.5  
Using race as a proxy to determine future price appreciation was a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The scale ranged from green neighborhoods that were 
homogenous and white to neighborhoods marked too risky “red” that were 
predominantly black. The race of the area’s residents was a greater factor in the 
color-coded desirability determinations than other quantifiable metrics like the 
home’s age, proximity to city centers, resident’s creditworthiness, transportation 
opportunities, public parks, or public services.6 For example, one of the wealthiest 
black neighborhoods in the country was in the Atlanta area surrounding Morehouse 
and Spelman Colleges. The FHA form evaluating this area marked it as the “best 
negro area in Atlanta” and noted that the homes were mostly owned by 
“professional men.” They even determined that it was a highly desirable location 
“for negroes.” Yet they still demarcated the area as a red zone and advised banks 
not to underwrite mortgages therein.7 This process of “redlining” eventually created 
a dual credit market based on race.8 
These surveyors were both reflecting and entrenching segregation patterns 
that led to higher-valued white neighborhoods and lower-valued black ones. 
Housing segregation was institutionalized and became a defining feature of the legal 
credit framework. It was not just the FHA that used these maps. Because the 
mortgage insurance market changed the nature of home lending, any bank providing 
a mortgage required an FHA guarantee. It would be foolish not to. Banks, credit 
 
4. Original FHA forms are available at https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/. 
5. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 198, 202 (1985); see also RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN 
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 64 (2017). Before the mortgage 
market went into full effect, the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) created maps of every 
neighborhood and categorized the risks of lending therein. HOLC appraisers used census data and 
elaborate questionnaires to predict property appreciation in neighborhoods across the country. The 
HOLC then used this data to create meticulous maps giving each metropolitan region and 
neighborhood across the country a value. 
6. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 198–99, 202. 
7. Robert K. Nelson et al., Mapping Inequality, AMERICAN PANORAMA, https:// 
dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=11/33.7535/-84.3565&opacity=0.8&city=atlanta-ga& 
sort=33&area=D17&adimage=3/75/-120 [https://perma.cc/LHP5-UTRM] ( l ast visited Mar. 8, 
2019 ).  
8. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at 64–65, 77–91. 
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unions, thrifts, building and loans associations, and other mainstream mortgage 
lenders relied on these risk calculations when they determined branch locations and 
made all lending decisions.  
The FHA did more to shape American life than any other New Deal agency. 
Congress created the FHA as part of its National Housing Act of 1934 and 
supplemented the FHA through the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (the GI 
Bill), administered by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). 
Between 1934 and 1968, the FHA and the VA programs created the modern 
mortgage market. The joint programs shaped the lending market for the next 
century. Through mortgage guarantees and standardization, Title I of the National 
Housing Act enabled the FHA to lower mortgage risk and increase capital 
investments in housing. The FHA credit insurance fund was backed by the full faith 
and credit of the U.S. Treasury, but it worked effectively to unleash billions of 
dollars of private capital investments worldwide.9 By shielding banks and other 
mortgage lenders from the risk of default, these new agencies enabled 
unprecedented amounts of private capital to fund residential mortgages. Through 
credit insurance and secondary market creation, Congress and the alphabet soup of 
banking and credit agencies made mortgage loans simple, low-risk, and plentiful.10 
Congress created Fannie Mae in 1938, which facilitated a secondary market 
that enabled investors and lenders to share the risk of mortgage default. Private and 
institutional investors in one part of the country could invest in mortgages in 
another, assuring that capital would always find yield. Treasury-backed insurance 
lowered risk and government-created secondary markets lowered transaction costs, 
which led to soaring bank profits and capital investments.11 These markets 
remained intact even as some New Deal programs came to an end and the 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) were partially privatized.  
Government agencies mandated uniformity to protect their investments. Even 
the construction of the homes was determined according to standard specifications. 
Lenders also had to comply with standard loan underwriting. The banking and 
mortgage agencies issued protocol and standards to align loan contracts. Interest 
rates and terms were dictated by federal standards. The standard issue mortgage 
 
9. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 17 (2006) (discussing how new home construction doubled 
from 1936 to 1941. In 1936, the FHA had lent half a billion dollars in guaranteed mortgages. By 1939, 
they had already issued $4 billion in mortgages and home improvement loans. Housing starts were 
332,000 in 1936 and 619,000 in 1941); see also JACKSON, supra note 5, at 205. 
10. See FED. HOUS. ADMIN., FHA STORY IN SUMMARY, 1934–1959 at 4 (1959), noted in 
HYMAN, supra note 3, at 53 (explaining that the federal guarantee revolutionized mortgages because the 
fund insured 90% of individual home mortgages. According to Julian Zimmerman, the FHA 
commissioner in the 1950s, when the scheme was first proposed, “it was such an innovation that many 
considered it radical and unworkable.” According to Zimmerman, “it was the last hope of private 
enterprise. The alternative was socialization of the housing industry.”). 
11. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 55 (explaining that the FHA program “completely  
reversed . . . the conventional justification for government intrusions.” FHA money was “not the dole” 
and “not taxpayer money”). 
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created by these reforms included reduced down payment requirements, lengthened 
loan terms, and low interest rates.12 A fixed rate mortgage with a 6% APR  
self-amortized over thirty years was typical. Banks were unlikely to lend to 
borrowers if the FHA did not insure the loan, and thus, banks were unlikely to stray 
from the mandated formula. In addition to standardized terms, the borrowers fit a 
certain “government-approved” mold, which was usually white, middle-class, and 
male. Yet to call those who qualified for these loans “the middle-class” is an evasive 
and circular description. These borrowers were formerly wage workers who lived 
near their place of employment, but through these low-cost mortgage loans, they 
became the much-heralded American middle-class. Most of these borrowers earned 
less than $2500 per year and could not have afforded to purchase a home even with 
a mortgage, which was hard to come by.13 After the New Deal mortgage reforms, 
the new middle-class could pay less in mortgage payments than they had previously 
paid for rent. Typical was the former New York City resident who said of his new 
home in suburban New Jersey: “We had been paying $50 per month rent, and here 
we come up and live for $29.00 a month.”14 With a few thousand dollars in savings, 
a wage earner could buy a house, build wealth, raise their children in the suburbs, 
and generate taxable income.15  
The FHA mortgage fundamentally changed American culture, creating the 
uniform white middle-class suburb and its attendant services—parks, schools, 
communities, and the bowling leagues lauded by Robert Putnam as essential for 
civic engagement and public trust.16 Yet this government-manufactured prosperity 
excluded blacks. The low-cost and abundant flow of mortgage credit stopped at the 
red lines around black ghettos.  
The FHA’s 1939 Underwriting Manual explicitly prohibited lending in 
neighborhoods that were changing in racial composition.17 The 1941 manual 
warned that “the rapidly rising Negro population ha[d] produced a problem in the 
 
12. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 204–05 (discussing how first, prior to their passage, a 
borrower would need a down payment anywhere from 30–70% of the home price to purchase a home. 
After these loans, a down payment of 10% was enough because the government would now essentially 
insure up to 90% of the collateral. Second, by extending the repayment period to thirty years and 
insisting that all loans be fully amortized, they reduced monthly payments and dramatically reduced 
default. Third, they created uniform housing standards that all new houses had to meet, which favored 
new, homogenous homes. And, Fourth, by eliminating high default risks, the programs brought 
mortgage interest down from 15% to 2–3%, making it possible for families of moderate means to 
become homeowners.); see also HYMAN, supra note 3, at 56–57. 
13. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 71. 
14. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 17. 
15. See id.  
16. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: AMERICA’S DECLINING SOCIAL CAPITAL, 
http://www.directory-online.com/Rotary/Accounts/6970/Downloads/4381/Bowling%20Alone% 
20Article.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAM2-7YYZ] ( last visited May 14, 2019).  
17. See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL 
POLICY IN AMERICA 37 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2010); see also DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, 
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 54 (Harvard  
Univ. Press 1993). 
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maintenance of real estate values.”18 A good neighborhood, according to the FHA, 
was one that prevented “inharmonious racial or nationality groups,” which meant 
that the only groups that did not threaten property values were white families.19 The 
FHA even offered suggestions for the best way of achieving this result, which they 
said was through “[race-based] subdivision regulations and suitable restrictive 
covenants.”20 Maintaining the racial purity, or a “harmonious racial mix,” became a 
vested interest for homeowners, realtors, and banks—all of whom held a financial 
stake in these mortgages. “If a neighborhood is to retain stability,” said the FHA 
manual, “it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same 
social and racial classes.”21 With government guarantees on the line, neighborhood 
groups vigilantly enforced racial covenants. Racial covenants were included in 
mortgage deeds, notes, and any sale transactions. The buyer contracted to only sell 
the home to those of the Caucasian race. The Supreme Court upheld these contracts 
in a 1926 case,22 and they remained valid until a different Court invalidated them in 
the 1948 case Shelly v. Kramer. 23 However, the FHA continued to promote their 
use until the 1950s.24 
As the white suburbs and black inner cities diverged in their mortgage access, 
two different credit markets emerged in both zones. Lower-risk mortgages led to 
higher wealth and stability in the white suburbs. These conditions also led to a 
healthy consumer credit market. In the redlined black ghettos, the economic climate 
was radically different. Without access to low-cost mortgages or even bank 
branches, the lenders that filled the gap in the ghetto were loan sharks, high-cost 
lenders, and contract sellers. By the 1950s, 85% of the homes sold to blacks in 
Chicago were sold on mortgage-mimicking contract sales with exploitative terms.25 
Speculators purchased properties for a few thousand dollars with private capital and 
then “sold” the home to a black buyer through contract for three to four times the 
price of the home.26 The contract sale was akin to a rent-to-own sale.27 The “buyer” 
was just a tenant with an option to own the home at some point in the future and 
 
18. See CONLEY, supra note 17, at 37. 
19. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5. 
20. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 18; see also FED. HOUS. AUTH., UNDERWRITING 
MANUAL,  pt. II, ¶ 233 (1936), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015018409246;view= 
1up;seq=13 [https://perma.cc/NH99-EFBH]; JACKSON, supra note 5, at 208. 
21. FED. HOUS. AUTH., supra note 20. 
22. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).  
23. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
24. See BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE AND THE EXPLOITATION 
OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA 43 (2009), citing Arnold R. Hirsch, Choosing Segregation: Federal Housing 
Policy Between Shelley and Brown, in JOHN F. BAUMAN ET AL., FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR 
HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 211–12 
(2000); see also id. 
25. See SATTER, supra note 24, at 38. 
26. See DEMPSEY TRAVIS, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BLACK CHICAGO 128–29 (1981). 
27. See SATTER, supra note 24, at 5 (discussing how the contract sellers “used the home as ‘bait’ 
to defraud the Negro out of a substantial sum of money and then push the [buyer] out into the street 
[in order to] defraud another party.”). 
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only if they made every payment on time. Blacks were therefore paying more each 
month, and what they were getting in return was a more tenuous property interest.28 
Their rights to the land was a loophole-laden contract as opposed to a deed. With 
one missed payment, a borrower was deemed to be in default and could lose their 
entire investment—the property, down payment, and all home improvements.29 
The bankers and brokers defended these contracts as a consequence of market 
pricing. “In a free economy a house is worth what anyone will pay for it,” said one 
contract seller.30  
Yet mortgage lending was nothing like a “free economy” because the federal 
government was artificially lowering interest rates and prices through structural 
supports. It was exactly the lack of government mortgage guarantees in the redlined 
zones that created the market for these costly contract sales while suburban 
mortgages were artificially buoyed.31  
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT 
Title I of the National Housing Act of 1934  
Before the New Deal credit reforms, most consumer lending took the form 
of installment loans, which is a loan that is paid off in small amounts over a short 
period of time. The same store that sold the merchandise provided the loan and 
assumed the risk of default. The interest rates were usually high, and the payback 
period was short. Often retailers would charge more than what was legal by simply 
 
28. Id. at 242–44, 248–49.  
29. Id. at 4; see TRAVIS, supra note 26, at 157. 
30. See SATTER, supra note 24, at 137, citing interview with John W. Baird (Feb. 13, 2004); see 
also BAIRD & WARNER, INC., 1855–1980: CELEBRATING 125 YEARS IN REAL ESTATE (1980). 
31. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 141–44 (discussing how, though black families could get 
mortgages, they paid significantly more for them than their white neighbors. In fact, the data on these 
subpar loans is clear that being black was directly correlated with paying high interest, more so than any 
other factor. The black middle-class was left to find mortgage loans in the private market. Few 
institutional investors were willing to provide capital for black mortgages, and black institutions did not 
have enough capital to provide for all such loans. In sum, the main barrier to black mortgages in the 
1950s, according to a representative of the National Association of Home Builders was “the lack of 
adequate financing” caused by “deep-rooted prejudice.” White insurance companies had provided 
much of the initial investment funds for the FHA markets, but black insurance companies did not have 
adequate capital. By 1945, the 35 members of the National Negro Insurance Association (NNIA) had 
only $1.5 million in capital—they held a total of 424 mortgages. Mechanics and Farmer affiliate, North 
Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company accounted for 55% of these funds. In contrast, just the top 
12 white insurance companies alone held $633 million in mortgages. The debt cycle became  
self-reinforcing after the original exclusion. Over 70 percent of suburban black families had to borrow 
just so they could purchase cars, appliances, furniture, and other side effects of middle-class life. The 
black middle-class’s debt caused lenders to charge the black middle-class higher interest on each new 
loan. More debt begets higher interest and vice versa. The added debt burden and high interest was a 
direct result of the lack of wealth and looping around once again, the debt made it even harder to accrue 
more wealth.). 
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elevating the base price of the goods. Most families with little wealth and low wages 
relied on installment loans to purchase appliances and furniture.32 
The purpose of Title I of the National Housing Act of 1934 was to provide 
economic stimulus by insuring low-dollar consumer credit loans for improving real 
property.33 These loans, administered by local banks and insured by the FHA, were 
intended to stimulate the construction industry by encouraging the flow of credit to 
the urban real estate market.34 When it functioned as intended, Title I allowed 
owners of aging urban housing to stay in their homes, preserving the local urban 
tax base and preventing the spread of urban blight, all key FHA policy goals of the 
time.35 Though Title I lapsed in 1937, it was renewed thereafter, and FHA continues 
to insure loans for home improvement under Title I to the present day. 
Financial institutions who wished to participate in Title I had to be vetted, as 
the statutory language of the National Housing Act of 1934 required participants to 
be “reliable financial institutions.” National and state banks, trust companies, and 
building and loan associations who already participated in the Federal Home Loan 
Bank System were automatically approved for FHA Title I insurance.36 Other 
financial institutions had to be individually approved to participate. 
In lieu of premium payments by participating financial institutions, the 
National Housing Act authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to 
provide Title I’s initial capital of up to $200,000,000.37 While other FHA programs 
like the Title II Mutual Mortgage Insurance program maintained a series of capital 
reserves funded by mortgage fees, Title I had no similar fund of its own.38 Based 
upon the FHA’s first annual report, it appears instead that the FHA’s Title I cap 
was funded exclusively by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.39 
Once approved, participating lenders were left to decide for themselves how 
to screen potential loan applicants.40 The terms of the FHA insurance limited 
compensation for lender claims to 20% of the aggregate amount leant under Title 
I. This incentivized lenders to perform due diligence on potential applicants and 
 
32. Id. at 32. 
33. See Hyman, supra note 3, at 96.  
34. RAYMOND J. SAULNIER, HAROLD G. HALCROW & NEIL H. JACOBY, FEDERAL LENDING, 
LOAN INSURANCE AND LOAN GUARANTEES 288 (1958). 
35. Judge Glock, How the Federal Housing Administration Tried to Save America’s Cities,  
1934–1960, 28 J. POL’Y HIST. 290 (2016), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal- 
of-policy-history/article/how-the-federal-housing-administration-tried-to-save-americas-cities 
19341960/DF2237D887E2D45D4B422AB0CE1D9F52/core-reader [https://perma.cc/KW6F-
4YJL]. Note: future citations of Judge Glock’s article will not include page numbers, as the article is 
not numbered in its online form. 
36. JOSEPH D. COPPOCK, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OF CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT 23 
(1940). 
37. National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§1701–1750 (1934). 
38. Glock, supra note 35. 
39. H.R. Doc. No. 88, at 24–25 (Jan. 29, 1935), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/ 
default/files/pdf/First-Annual-Report-of-the-Federal-Housing-Administration.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/G6VL-E5YG]. 
40. COPPOCK, supra note 36, at 23. 
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attempt collection on past-due debts directly from the borrower when possible.41 
Lending institutions could also buy and sell the notes on loans made under Title I, 
creating a nascent secondary market.42 
When unable to collect, lenders could file a claim with the FHA in 
Washington, D.C. no earlier than sixty days and no later than thirteen months after 
the last payment received.43 Provided the claim did not exceed the statutory cap of 
20% of an institution’s aggregate loaned dollars under Title I, the FHA would pay 
any and all of the following: net unpaid amount of the funds advanced to the 
borrower; uncollected earned interest; uncollected late charges; uncollected court 
costs; attorney’s fees; and handling costs.44 The Government then assumed the debt 
and could attempt collection from the borrower.  
Lenders, free to establish their own screening methods for borrowers, 
preferred borrowers with stable income and prospects of long-term employment 
rather than borrowers of a specific overall income level.45 Thus, salary, not overall 
wealth or the ability to provide collateral, played a large role in a borrower’s 
creditworthiness in the consumer credit market spawned and stimulated by Title I.46 
While the precise experience of a borrower seeking a home improvement or 
modernization loan under Title I varied with each financial institution, certain 
general features of the experience are worth noting. 
First, the borrower filled out a form stating the amount sought and the uses 
to which he would put the money if approved.47 If the borrower’s statements 
signaled compliance with the parameters of the program, the lender would notify 
the FHA in Washington, D.C., which would adjust the lender’s insurance reserve 
credit accordingly.48 Because lending institutions generally paid the vendor of goods 
or services directly rather than giving borrowers cash, the borrower would often 
have to return to sign a form stating the work had been performed to a satisfactory 
standard.49 
The novelty of Title I insured loans was that they were made with no collateral 
security, no co-signer, and paid off in equal monthly installments.50 In addition to 
the promise of insurance, the FHA attempted to mitigate lender worries at 
undertaking these risks by capping loans at $2000. That 6433 of the 10,029 approved 
lenders actually ended up participating in Title I suggests that these measures 
 
41. Id. at 26. 
42. Id. at 23. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Hyman, supra note 3, at 100, citing a report by Irvin Bussing, a New York State Savings 
Bank Association economist. 
46. Id. at 107. 
47. COPPOCK, supra note 36, at 24–26. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. HYMAN, supra note 3, at 116. 
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succeeded at alleviating lenders’ fears.51 On the other hand, certain lenders found 
Title I more appealing than others, as 84% of the number and volume of loans 
could be attributed to only 10% of participating lenders.52 
To keep loans affordable for consumers, the FHA limited finance charges on 
Title I loans to 5%, reflecting a true interest rate of about 9.7% per annum on the 
unpaid balance.53 The 5% limit included fees for the loan but not late fees. Data 
from Title I’s initial run between 1934 and 1937 reveal the average size of all notes 
issued was $386, the average length of the loan thirty months, the average monthly 
payment $11, and the average time payment charge of $49.54 By comparison, an 
inflation calculator from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that a monthly 
payment of $11 in September 1934 would be the equivalent buying power of 
approximately $204.18 in September 2018.55 
While the statutory maximum length of loans was five years, over 95% of all 
loans during Title I’s initial run were for thirty-six months or less and over 75% of 
early loans were for under $300.56 This information supports the contention that 
the averages cited above are reflective of the true experience of lenders and 
borrowers in mid-1930s and are not being distorted by a few extreme outliers. 
Although only 34 of the 3074 counties in the United States had no loans 
insured by the FHA under Title I, loans concentrated in a few heavily-insured 
areas.57 21% of all Title I loans went to improve homes in New York, while 14% 
went to California.58 In fact, 66% of all Title I loan dollars went to only ninety-eight 
counties nationwide, concentrating in densely populated areas experiencing rapid 
population growth and having relatively high per capita incomes.59 
Title I’s Impact on the Consumer Credit Market: Title I’s ambition to offer 
consumer-grade credit was so groundbreaking, the FHA had to “borrow” the 
expertise of two bankers, J. Andrew Painter and Roger Steffan, from National City 
Bank in New York City to help implement the program.60 At the time, National 
City Bank was one of the few private banks to have a successful, albeit small, 
consumer credit division, sustained more by its popularity as a community relations 
tool than for its profitability. In fact, Steffan’s boss at National City Bank was the 
head of public relations, reinforcing their view that consumer loans were a publicity 
stunt first and a business opportunity second.61 
 
51. COPPOCK, supra note 36, at 6. 
52. Id. at 5. 
53. Id. at 3. 
54. Id. at 7–8. 
55. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=11&year1= 
193412&year2=201809 [https://perma.cc/KC3H-EGHR] ( last visited Mar. 8, 2019 ).  
56. COPPOCK, supra note 36, at 8. 
57. Id. at 7. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 98. 
61. Id. 
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From a business perspective, National City Bank’s perspective is 
understandable, as small consumer loans cost banks as much to administer as large 
loans and tended to yield less profit. At 5% interest, Title I could not likely have 
drawn the attention or enthusiasm of the banking sector prior to the Depression, 
when commercial loans yielded far better returns.62 Thus, the Great Depression’s 
disruption to the natural order of banks’ lending primarily to businesses likely 
contributed to the rise of Title I and consumer loans in general. 
Banks benefitted institutionally from Title I. Many financial institutions had 
idle staff due to waning commercial lending activity, and servicing Title I loans 
provided a profitable diversion for these employees. Later, when consumer loans 
became established in the financial sector, banks would build upon this 
infrastructure to develop fully-fledged consumer credit departments that expanded 
beyond the limited purposes of Title I.63 
Contemporary research by Joseph D. Coppock on behalf of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research casts doubt on whether the program stimulated 
lending or the construction industry as intended.64 While Title I insurance offered 
lenders the safety net65 to take a risk on making small, short-term, amortized 
consumer credit loans with no down payment,66 bankers may have found consumer 
loans attractive for other reasons independent of the FHA’s insurance—namely, 
because they were small and had a high repayment rate.67 Consumer credit loans 
under Title I offered lenders a higher-interest, short-term investment to offset their 
lower-interest, long-term lending portfolios.68 Louis Hyman notes in Debtor Nation 
that lenders rarely used the FHA’s insurance provisions,69 and contemporary data 
confirms this claim, revealing that only about 5.8% of all Title I notes (3.4% of the 
aggregate dollar volume) between 1934 and 1937 had claims paid against them.70 
Even if Title I’s effectiveness as a stimulus is debatable, it likely popularized 
the consumer grade credit loan in banking circles and created supply-side 
competition in the untapped consumer credit market.71 Indeed, the FHA’s 
popularization of consumer credit—not its insurance—may have been its most 
valuable contribution to the consumer credit market. Once the specter of the 
Depression receded and the post-World War II building boom commenced, 
 
62. Id. at 97. 
63. Id. at 103. 
64. COPPOCK, supra note 36. 
65. HYMAN, supra note 3, at 102. 
66. Id. at 105. 
67. Id. at 102. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. COPPOCK, supra note 36, at 8. Note: these statistics do not account for money paid by 
borrowers to the Government once it assumed the debt. 
71. Id. at 5 (citing statements by then-Federal Housing Director Stewart McDonald’s testimony 
before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in 1936). 
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consumer loans became an increasingly important and ubiquitous feature of the 
American credit landscape.72 
As financial institutions became more savvy to consumer loan best practices 
and sought profit through volume of sales, the process to apply for consumer loans 
became more data-driven and impersonal.73 Inspired by the Ford assembly line, 
lenders began seeking a quick, accurate loan approval system that could find 
borrowers who were, on average, reliable enough to create profit.74 In this way, the 
general consumer credit market that Title I spawned evolved to meet growing 
consumer demand for small-dollar, short-term loans. 
Likewise, Title I itself evolved, ensuring its survival to the present. The 
individual loan limits, aggregate budgetary limits, and improvement parameters of 
Title I changed over the years, ebbing and flowing with the policy goals of 
subsequent administrations.75 Simultaneously, the definition of acceptable 
renovation and modernization projects grew to include purchasing refrigerators, gas 
and oil heaters, and other upgrades;76 conversion of property to multifamily 
dwellings, governmental uses, or commercial uses;77 and slum clearance and 
rehabilitation. Eventually, Title I grew to embrace mobile homes and prefabricated 
homes. 
The FHA transformed the consumer credit market by lowering its risks and 
enabling banks, finance companies, and credit card companies to profit from 
consumer loans for the first time. However, once the Title II provisions fueled the 
creation of the robust consumer credit market, the federal guarantees were no 
longer needed, and the market moved forward on its own momentum. Interest rates 
on small consumer loans fell because the market shared the risk, and no individual 
seller was implicated. If FHA home loans created suburban life, that life was 
enhanced by consumer loans that allowed the new middle-class to purchase luxuries 
like cars, appliances, and apparel. The consumer credit market for whites shifted 
from the rigid and expensive installment lending model to the flexible and less 
expensive “revolving credit” model enabled by the credit card. Credit card 
companies allowed borrowers to “revolve” their debt, or roll over their balances, 
for the first time. Credit cards also gave borrowers flexibility in purchasing and 
 
72. HYMAN, supra note 3, at 99. 
73. Id. at 100. 
74. Id. at 106. 
75. See generally Grace Milgram, HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FIN. AND URBAN AFFAIRS, A 
Chronology of Housing Legislation and Selected Executive Actions, 1892–1992 (Dec. 1993), https://
www.huduser.gov/portal//publications/pdf/HUD-11661.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5XW-GRPB]. 
76. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., Fixing up Your Home and How to Finance It,  
HUD.GOV, https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/sfh/title/sfixhs [https://perma.cc/ 
GEK3-SLN2] ( last visited May 14, 2019 ). 
77. Milgram, supra note 75; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., Manufactured Home Loan 
Insurance (Title I), https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/sfh/title/manuf14 [https:// 
perma.cc/86PJ-B49F] ( last visited Mar. 8, 2019 ). Note: mobile and manufactured homes were 
considered personal and not real property when these measures were added to Title I in the late 1969. 
Id. 
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significantly expanded purchasing power because they could be used at a variety  
of retailers.78  
Most of these consumer loans went toward making purchases that made life 
easier and more enjoyable, but credit also created a buffer to protect wealth and 
livelihood against life’s unpredictable tumults. Credit card and finance companies 
avoided redlined neighborhoods due to both racism and their risk-prone economy. 
These communities relied on extractive installment credit that came coupled with 
instability and continued poverty.79 This was another instance in which the New 
Deal credit reforms created a wealth-producing credit market for whites and an 
inescapable debt trap for blacks. According to historian Louis Hyman, “[T]he 
modern credit system of the twentieth century was built by white men for white 
men, leaving other Americans to borrow in older, more expensive and dangerous 
ways.”80 The credit system did not just build wealth for whites, but it “constrained 
the credit options for poor, urban African Americans [in ways that] would have 
been inconceivable for the rest of America.”81  
Changes to Banking Regulation 
New Deal banking reforms brought about federal governance of banks 
through newly created agencies that administered new restrictions, limits, and 
chartering requirements. Most significant of these reforms was federal deposit 
insurance, which effectively ended runs on banks and allowed banks to survive 
panics. Insurance subsidies came coupled with heavy government restrictions. The 
Glass Steagall Act of 1933 and the National Bank Act of 1935 restricted bank 
activities, capped interest rates, and reduced risks.82 These laws also capped bank 
size, restricted conglomeration, and imposed branching restrictions, which enabled 
small community banks to survive and thrive. 
All of these laws and subsidies created a nation of small community banks. 
The rationale of favoring community banking over large conglomerate banks was 
that smaller banks would favor the weak as opposed to the strong and that capital 
would remain within a region allowing communities to invest their savings in local 
projects. Small community banks were inherently less stable than larger 
conglomerates because their stability depended on a single community’s economy. 
Markets naturally favored large conglomerate banks that could diversify their risks 
 
78. Id. at 10–72 (showing Louis Hyman’s explanation that in the post-war credit economy, the 
“lines of race would definitively cross lines of class.”); see also Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, 
Address at the Economic Development Conference of the Greenlining Institute (Oct. 11, 1997). 
79. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 10–72. 
80. Id. at 7.  
81. Id.  
82. See 12 U.S.C. § 264 (transferred to 12 U.S.C. §1811); McFadden Act of 1927, 12 U.S.C. § 36 
(repealed 1994) (prohibiting branching across state lines); FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY,  
S. REP. NO. 473, 69th CONG., at 6 (1st Sess.). The FDIC was created by the Glass Steagall Act and 
made permanent by the Banking Act of 1935. Federal Reserve History, Banking Act of 1933,  
§ 12B. (a), at 7.  
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and move their funds and investments to their most profitable markets, which was 
usually Wall Street. These laws and protections were meant to counteract the natural 
markets. Larger banks had better access to liquidity and capital from a wide selection 
of robust financial markets. Smaller banks were constrained to investments in only 
their communities. Federal deposit insurance stabilized and supported community 
banks through federal subsidies. This is why the small bankers of the South and the 
Democratic Party that supported them fought for it.  
With deposit insurance, small community banks could profit from their 
control over a community’s resources while the federal government protected them 
from the constant failure and runs that besieged their industry up until that point. 
Yet localism was supplemented by the mammoth nationalized mortgage market 
enabled by the FHA.83 The post-New Deal period was thus the golden age for 
community banks. The FHA guaranteed their loans, FDIC insurance prevented 
runs, and federal reserve liquidity protection saved them from a regional credit 
crunch. The federal government created the market for “small, community” 
banking.84  
Civil Rights Protests Against Credit Markets 
During the capital-building and prosperous decades of the 1940s to the 1960s 
fueled by the mixed economy, black communities were lending and borrowing in a 
laissez faire credit market.85 Before the press and the nation focused on Martin 
Luther King’s Civil Rights coalition, activists and community groups were 
protesting against exploitative credit and exclusionary lending transactions. The first 
protest led by blacks against white businesses occurred in Harlem in 1935.86 The 
 
83. The banking industry debate between large and small banks mirrored the age-old national 
divide between industrial interests and agricultural interests. Bankers in the North wanted more 
permissive banking laws that allowed banks to readily expand and operate across several regions. 
Bankers in the South and West were concerned that expansive Northern banking conglomerates would 
pull capital from across the country due to the amount of services those banks already provided and 
drive regional banks out of business. Roosevelt sided with the South and West and successfully 
advocated for anti-competitive banking laws to protect regional banks. With Roosevelt on their side, 
Southern states fought for FDIC insurance, which made small banking possible. See CHARLES 
CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BANKING 
CRISES AND SCARCE CREDIT 16, 191 (2014). 
84. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73–6 (1933) (legislation explicitly prohibited bank 
conglomeration or branching of any kind and emphasized unit banking). 
85. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23–24 (2014); see also 
ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH 14 (2016). Modern research by 
Thomas Piketty, Robert Gordon, and others shows that the era from the New Deal until 1970 was an 
exceptional era of prosperity and wealth equality in American history; this boom was a temporary boost 
to middle-class wealth and standard of living. 
86. See Stephen Robertson, Lecture at the German Historical Institute: Toward a Spatial 
Narrative of the 1935 Harlem Riot: Mapping and Storytelling after the Geospatial Turn (Oct. 20, 2016), 
in http://drstephenrobertson.com/presentation/toward-a-spatial-narrative-of-the-1935-harlem-riot 
[https://perma.cc/D2LJ-7GX6]; see also Stephen Robertson, Lecture at the National Council on Public  
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spark was lit when a teenage shoplifter was beaten by a store owner. The protest 
turned into violence, in a precursor of future events, rioters destroyed white 
business establishments while sparing black-owned businesses.87 Most race riots 
before the Great Depression were white-led riots against blacks, so this was a 
change, though violent protests were rare. In northern cities, collective action was 
beginning to coalesce around specific economic demands in segregated black 
ghettos. These protesters focused on discriminatory hiring practices and 
exploitation by white lenders who sold goods at high interest with heavy markups.88 
These early efforts were focused on local and state action and enjoyed a few crucial 
victories. Harlem community groups persuaded the New York state legislature to 
enact consumer-protecting legislation that curtailed some of the most onerous 
contract terms provided by lenders.89 
One side of the protests focused on encouraging more black businesses and 
called for “Bigger and Better Negro Business.”90 This movement was being waged 
by local black organizations that spanned the political spectrum from radical black 
nationalists to the conservative National Business League.91 Another strand of 
collective action with the slogan “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” demanded 
that white businesses operating in the ghetto hire more black workers. These groups 
put pressure on local businesses using boycotts.92 Adam Clayton Powell emerged as 
the most vocal leader of the boycott movement and several years later, formed the 
“Greater New York Coordinating Committee for Employment” aimed at securing 
jobs through nonviolent protest.93 
In 1935, several white merchants challenged a black boycott of their Baltimore 
businesses in the Maryland Court of Appeals.94 The court ruled in favor of the 
boycotting community groups stating that the black community had “an 
 
History Conference in Baltimore: Mapping a Riot: Harlem, 1935 (Mar. 19, 2016), http://
drstephenrobertson.com/presentation/mapping-a-riot-harlem-1935 [https://perma.cc/2QM3-
8NLP]. 
87. Supra note 86. 
88. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL 
WEALTH GAP 315 n.18 (2017).  
89. See ANNE FLEMING, CITY OF DEBTORS (2018). 
90. ABRAM HARRIS, THE NEGRO AS CAPITALIST 177 (2010). 
91. See THOMAS BAUMAN, THE PEKIN: THE RISE AND FALL OF CHICAGO’S FIRST BLACK 
OWNED THEATER 24 (2014). 
92. See Albon Holsey, Business Manager, Crisis, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS 
IN COLORED SCHOOLS at Jackson, Miss. (July 1929) (explaining that the Harlem Labor Union made 
up of former Garveyites, had picketed white stores that refused to hire blacks in the 1932 “Don’t Buy 
Where You Can’t Work” movement. Soon black leaders across the country began talking about 
leveraging the “purchase power” of the black dollar to fight discrimination.). 
93. See CHERYL GREENBERG, “OR DOES IT EXPLODE?”: BLACK HARLEM IN THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION 135 (1997). 
94. See Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421 (Ct. Spec. App. 1935). 
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unquestionable right” to present their cause “in a peaceable way.”95 The judge even 
seemed to be encouraging black protestors to “persuade white employers to engage 
colored employees” and to orchestrate boycotts of those who did not “by 
organization, public meetings, propaganda and by personal solicitation.” 96 In a 
troubling twist, however, the court seemed to put the onus on the black community 
to achieve their demands stating that “whether they succeed or fail will depend on 
the cooperation of their people.” 97 The subtext seemed to be that it was the 
responsibility of the black population to work to end racism. The ruling set the stage 
for the civil rights movement’s early strategy of leveraging black market power and 
using organized boycotts against Jim Crow buses in Montgomery, Alabama.  
By the 1960s, black poverty was deeply entrenched, but more importantly, it 
was marked by its stark contrast to the white middle-class’s prosperity.98 Not only 
had the majority of black families not ridden the postwar economic boom; 
conditions in the ghetto had actually worsened.99 By the early 1980s, almost half of 
black children lived in poverty in contrast with less than 15% of white children.100 
Black families had less than one-fifth the wealth of white families. The Federal 
Reserve studied the racial wealth gap in 1967 and concluded that “the evidence 
appears overwhelming that the net wealth position of black families is substantially 
poorer than that of white families of similar characteristics.” 101 For whites and 
blacks earning more than $20,000 a year in 1967, whites had a net wealth of $100,009 
and blacks had $30,195. At the bottom, for incomes less than $2499 a year, whites 
had $10,681 and blacks had $2148.102 The Federal Reserve study concluded that the 
source of the wealth gap was historic inequalities in income and opportunities, “a 
legacy of past economic deprivation,” which would not be fixed even if the income 
gap was eliminated. It could only be closed by a reversal of past privileges. A 
separate study on black wealth explained that the reason for the large wealth gap 
had nothing to do with black savings patterns. In fact, “the bulk of consumption 
studies show[ed] that blacks saved more at any given level of income.” The study 
 
95. Id. This case was followed by New Negro All. v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938), 
in which the Supreme Court held that blacks were allowed to picket businesses that employed an  
all-white staff under principles of labor law. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY 
THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 269 (1977) (explaining that “Blacks became more indignant over 
their condition—not only as oppressed racial minority in a white society but as poor people in an 
affluent one.”).  
99. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 140–64 (2012).  
100. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES: PEOPLE AND FAMILIES – 
1959 TO 2017, tbl. 3, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/
historical-poverty-people.html [https://perma.cc/6YFQ-WCJA] ( last updated Aug. 28, 2018 ). 
101. Henry S. Terrell, Wealth Accumulation of Black and White Families: The Empirical Evidence, 
26 J. FIN. 377 (1971). 
102. See RICHARD STERNER, THE NEGRO’S SHARE: A STUDY OF INCOME, CONSUMPTION, 
HOUSING, AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 93 (1943); see also Terrell, supra note 101. 
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concluded that “these rather stark findings on wealth accumulation suggest that 
economic equality for black families will not be achieved when the current annual 
income gap between black and white families is eliminated because a considerable 
wealth gap will remain as a legacy of past economic deprivation.”103 The wealth and 
opportunity gap would continue unabated without direct government action—in 
other words, something more than just stopping racial discrimination.  
While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were in 
fact the beginning of historic changes that continue today, they were also the high-
water mark of the civil rights movement. As soon as the acts were passed, it was 
apparent that the laws did nothing to remedy past wrongs—they were not designed 
to do so. The Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act finally guaranteed the 
black population the same rights they had already been granted in the 14th and 15th 
Amendments passed 100 years earlier. Even these laws would have been disregarded 
had they not been supported by Supreme Court decrees and, more importantly, 
federal troops. The South was just as adamant about fighting the decrees of 
Congress in the 1960s as it had been in the 1860s. Only this time, the federal 
government forced compliance and eventually got it. The doors of the white only 
schoolhouse and voting stations were opened, but what could be done about the 
redlined ghettos and the effects of centuries of exclusion and poverty? The decree 
of equal protection before the law was ineffective as a remedy to this history. In 
fact, it stood as a barrier to it, for how could the federal government remedy its 
race-based laws without new race-based laws? Soon, claims of racial discrimination 
would be used to block and contest all government attempts at race-based remedies 
and affirmative action.  
Blacks were still unemployed at twice the rate of whites, they occupied low 
wage jobs, had little wealth, and these momentous laws provided no conceivable 
path out of poverty.104 Abolishing racist laws was not the same thing as achieving 
equality. Ending segregation was not the same thing as integration. Ending job 
discrimination was not the same thing as having jobs. Ending credit discrimination 
was not the same thing as providing credit. A legal right to equality was meaningless 
to the destitute and marginalized unless it could chart a path to actual equality. The 
movement shifted toward “achieving the fact of equality” as Bayard Rustin wrote 
in 1965, rather than merely “removing the barriers to full opportunity.”105 If it was 
true, according to Rustin, that “freedom must be conceived in economic 
categories,” the civil rights movement turned its focus to achieving justice as an 
 
103. Terrell, supra note 101. 
104. See LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND 
CONTROVERSY 11 (1967) (quoting “The year 1965,” according to Lee Rainwater and William Yancey, 
“may be known in history as the time when the civil rights movement discovered, in this sense of 
becoming explicitly aware, that abolishing legal racism would not produce Negro equality.”). 
105. Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement,  
39 COMMENT. 3564, 3566 (1965).  
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economic matter.106 The exploitative effects of housing segregation in the North 
were sown through legal contracts and bureaucratic zoning. Intractable poverty and 
inequality were just as oppressive as the South’s brute hostility but a far less visible 
problem to address. However, it had to be addressed in order to achieve racial 
equality. Urban ghettos were zones with fewer public resources such as quality 
schools, roads, hospitals, universities, and infrastructure.107 The segregated ghetto 
contained too little capital to appreciate, and its main export, labor, struggled to find 
work as industries left America’s cities for the less costly suburbs before eventually 
moving offshore.108  
These trends were self-reinforcing. White flight included not just 
homeowners, but their consumer power, and ultimately led to the drain of 
investment and business funds. The decline of the inner city was not just a 
byproduct of racial segregation, but had to do with the decline of industrial 
manufacturing in the inner city. Large industrial plants either moved to the suburbs, 
closed up shop, or moved abroad. These trends led to higher joblessness in the 
inner city and counterintuitively to increased costs. The state of the ghetto was one 
of high prices and general deterioration—it was expensive to be poor and 
isolated.109 Suburban retailers could lower costs due to their access to an 
economically diverse set of customers and higher sales volume. Small businesses 
charged more for products because of their lower sales volumes and higher 
operating costs (due to the isolation of the ghetto). The black inner-city economy 
 
106. See Bayard Rustin, Funding Full Citizenship, 6 COUNCIL J. 3 (1967). 
107. See CARO, supra note 3, at 20 (explaining that even urban renewal programs that upgraded 
and revived America’s cities in the 1960s did so at the black population’s expense. James Baldwin 
referred to “urban renewal” programs as “negro removal,” for the effect of urban architects like Robert 
Moses was that highways and roads built through ghettos pushed, packed, and divided black residents 
into increasingly overcrowded and under-resourced neighborhoods.). 
108. See FRANK G. DAVIS, THE ECONOMICS OF BLACK COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: AN 
ANALYSIS AND PROGRAM FOR AUTONOMOUS GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (1972) (noting that the 
“condition of economic stagnation and decay in the black ghettos of America is not self-correcting 
within the price system. Rather, the pull of economic forces sets up a permanent condition of inequality 
between a low-income labor-intensive black economy and the rest of the economy.”). 
109. Ed Glaeser, Ghettos: The Changing Consequences of Ethnic Isolation, 7 REGIONAL  
REV. (1997), https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/regional-review/1997/spring/ghettos-the-
changing-consequences-of-ethnic-isolation.aspx [https://perma.cc/939Z-629X]. Note: Despite its 
negative connotations, I have chosen to use the term “ghetto” for several reasons, First, during the 
crucial years of reform and protest, the black activists across the political spectrum as well as the 
reformers and academics addressing the credit issues covered herein used the term “ghetto” to describe 
segregated black neighborhoods. Second, and more crucially, the alternative terms “black 
neighborhood” or “inner city” do not accurate connote the history of these black spaces. “Black 
neighborhood” is a term that erases the creation of these spaces. These areas were not chosen 
voluntarily by their residents—strict racial segregation has been a constant. And this racial segregation 
was enforced through violence—both state and private—and law—both private contract law, zoning, 
and legislation. The term ghetto may not be the right terminology, but to me it draws attention to the 
conditions of its formation through violence, law, and cohesion. I agree with critics of the word when 
it is used as a description for subpar goods or conditions, which is a modern usage of the term. I have 
not used the word ghetto in that way in this article and believe it is that usage that has burdened the 
term with associations of stigma and racism.  
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was a uniquely destructive mix of negative forces that impeded the economic 
mobility of the residents. In 1965, Kenneth Clark described the “dark ghettoes” as 
“social, political, educational, and—above all—economic colonies.”110 Though 
Clark was not a black nationalist, the black nationalist movement viewed the 
segregation of the ghetto through the prism of anti-colonization movements 
abroad. The ghetto did not resemble a colony in many ways, but one could be 
forgiven for drawing the analogy when observing the drastically different economies 
in the “dark ghetto” in contrast to the white suburbs.  
Moreover, just like the violence that accompanied the anti-colonialization 
fights abroad, a violent resistance also ignited in the U.S. ghettos. This resistance 
was unlike anything the U.S. populace had experienced heretofore.111 A CBS TV 
broadcast announced, “This was not a riot. It was an insurrection against all 
authority.”112 Johnson deployed the National Guard with military equipment to deal 
with the civil insurgency.113 Doug McAdams’s study of the civil rights movement 
after 1965 explained, “It would not seem an overstatement to argue that the level 
of open defiance of the established economic and political order was as great during 
this period as during any other in the country’s history, save the Civil War.”114 
Sixteen days after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Harlem erupted in 
violence. Five days after President Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
the Watts district in Los Angeles exploded in a deadly riot that killed and injured 
many and destroyed millions of dollars’ worth of property. Watts had been 
thoroughly segregated over the preceding decades, making poverty concentrated 
and extreme.115 One in three people in Watts were unemployed, all but a single 
industrial plant had abandoned the Los Angeles district, and rioters targeted white 
property as they channeled their anger toward their perceived exploiters—white 
absentee property owners, pawn shops, and grocery stores. In Chicago’s West Side, 
rioters claimed that they wanted to “drive white ‘exploiters’ out of the ghetto.”116  
Though rioting and looting in some places seemed like a random and rage-
fueled destruction of imprecise orientation, observers noted that there were typically 
specific targets. Generally, rioters directed their pent up anger specifically at ghetto 
 
110. See KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK GHETTO: DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL POWER 11 (1965).  
111. See Paul C. Tullier, School Dropouts Build Explosive Unemployment in Ranks of Youth,  
KAN. CITY TIMES, May 3, 1963, at 38.  
112. See GERALD HORNE, FIRE THIS TIME: THE WATTS UPRISING AND THE 1960S, at 36 
(1997). 
113. See ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE 
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 71 (2016) (explaining that Gov. Jerry Brown called 
the rioters “terrorists” and promised to deal with them “forcefully”).  
114. See JOHN SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, 
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 73 (1996). 
115. See Joseph A. Califano, Report of the President’s Task Force on the Los Angeles Riots 6  
(Aug. 11–15, 1965) in folder Califano Los Angeles Riots, Ramsey Clark Report, in box 47, in Office 
Files of Joseph A. Califano (accessed at Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library). 
116. See DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE 
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 439 (1986). 
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lenders.117 The Washington Post reported that the stores that sold on credit were the 
“most popular victims of the riots.”118 Upon studying these accounts, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) concluded that rioters were in fact engaged in “selective 
burning and looting” of stores they felt “had treated them unfairly” and that these 
rioters went to the lenders “not to loot, but to destroy the credit records of the 
stores they burned. This was their solution to oppressive debt.”119 Stores were seized 
by rioters who destroyed the records (books) on which their debts were recorded. 
Journalists reported crowds chanting “burn the damn records;” a mother told 
looters at a grocery store, “Don’t grab the groceries, grab the book.”120 The protest 
against unequal interest and contract terms was the Birmingham struggle of the 
northern ghetto. However, this protest did not capture the national attention as did 
the fight between Bull Connor’s dogs and clubs and the peaceful children marching 
in the South. One could be captured on the New York Times front page to expose 
the brutality of Southern Jim Crow, the lawlessness of the Southern justice system, 
and the obvious moral rectitude of the civil rights movement. The other—the riots, 
the destruction of property, the opaque legal mechanisms of the installment 
contract and debt financing—was not picture-worthy or easy to understand. 
Nevertheless, the Jim Crow credit market was also rooted in centuries of racial 
discrimination, and its eradication was just as necessary to the realization of the 
country’s democratic ideals.  
THE POOR PAY MORE 
By the 1960s, credit card transactions were ubiquitous in American life and 
the nature of credit was separate and unequal. Credit cards did not cross the redlines 
of the ghetto and installment credit was almost unheard of in the middle-class white 
suburbs. Black buyers made almost every large purchase with high-cost installment 
credit, where the purchases were paid back over time with high additional interest 
costs. Even some small purchases, like groceries, doctor visits, and encyclopedias, 
were bought on installment credit.121 Black families across all income levels had 
more debt than whites and paid higher interest.122 
 
117. See Consumer Credit and the Poor 1: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 
90th Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1968) [hereinafter Consumer Credit and the Poor 1]; see also HYMAN, supra note 3, 
at 194. 
118. See Murray Seeger, Washington Ghetto Smoldering Ruins Block After Block, L.A. TIMES,  
Apr. 7, 1968, at 18. 
119. See Federal Trade Commission Report on Credit Practices: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on 
Fin. Insts. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 18, 22 (1968). 
120. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 180. 
121. See DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF  
LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 49–57 (1967) (explaining that the most common purchases were appliances 
and furniture and because families living in unstable housing in the ghettos moved more often, they 
bought more furniture). 
122. See Andrew Brimmer, Small Business and Economic Development in the Negro Community, in 
BLACK BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 165–68 (1971). 
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In the 1964 study The Poor Pay More, Columbia professor David Caplovitz 
described the ghetto debt market as a “deviant one in which exploitation and fraud 
are the norm rather than the exception.”123 Specifically, he found that New York 
ghetto residents paid much higher prices—“unbelievably” high according to the 
author—for goods than anywhere else. These customers were not buying more 
goods than the average consumer or even relying more on credit, but they obtained 
“considerably less value for their dollar.”124 Another 1968 study conducted by the 
FTC reported that 93% of the sales in the black ghetto were on installment 
compared with only 27% in white suburbia. The FTC’s study, which was also 
labeled “The Poor Pay More,” calculated that for $100 of goods, the poor paid $300 
compared to $150 paid by those buying from general retailers outside the ghetto.125 
The FTC report also found costs in the ghetto to be higher across the board for 
housing, food, and general services.126 The FTC called these results “disturbing.”127  
This “disturbing” price of credit had to do with the distinct ghetto credit 
market that had developed as a result of credit redlining. Large retailers did not 
operate within the ghetto, so most purchases were financed at the same store that 
sold the goods.128 Because these consumers were a “captive market,” there was no 
price competition among these retailers. Lenders courted customers through 
advertising, promises of easy credit, and door-to-door salesmanship.129 Borrowers 
fell into a continuous debt relationship with these merchants, a situation 
appropriately described as an “urban sharecropping system.”130 
Loan default was common and occurred at much higher rates than in the 
suburbs. Financial instability created by poverty and wage irregularities was partially 
responsible. But the higher cost of credit was also to blame. Resentment contributed 
to the instability as well. Ghetto retailers sold shoddy merchandise at high prices.131 
Senator William Proxmire, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, believed 
that resentment and frustration also played a part in the higher default rate. 
Proxmire noted that these retailers often sold goods that were fraudulently 
described as in better condition than they were, which frustrated borrowers. When 
the appliance stopped working, Proxmire explained, “many [borrowers] stop 
making payments.”132 The high default led to immediate problems with 
repossession and threats of criminal penalties, but also led to future restrictions of 
 
123. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 121, at xvii.  
124. See id. at 81, 88, 96–97, 107–09, 16–17, 90–91, 110–12, 119, 125 (explaining that even 
among inner city borrowers, blacks paid more for credit than did whites).  
125. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL 
SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS, at IX (1968). 
126. See Consumer Credit and the Poor 1, supra note 117, at 9–10. 
127. Id. at 3–4. 
128. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 121, at 49–57. 
129. Id. at 58–80.  
130. Id. at 25, 100. 
131. Id. at 21.  
132. See Consumer Credit and the Poor 1, supra note 117, at 7. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395876
Clean Final Edit_Baradaran.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/18/19  8:43 PM 
2019] JIM CROW CREDIT 123 
credit for ghetto borrowers and higher costs for all the retailers who spent money 
on collections and repossession.  
Contract defaults often entailed repossession, wage garnishments, court 
judgments, and even shakedowns by lenders, all of which were unimaginable for 
suburban lenders. 133 Job loss could lead to default on a furniture loan, but a missed 
payment could also lead to job loss because it was common for an employer to fire 
an employee whose wages were garnished in order to avoid the hassle of paying 
more than one person and to keep a streamlined system.134 Moreover, law 
enforcement and the court system were a part of the black credit system and thereby 
added the risk of criminal sanctions to credit transactions.135 Ghetto lenders were 
the face of exploitation, humiliation, shame, and injustice, so it is unsurprising that 
they were the first targets of the violence.  
However, these lenders were not the direct cause of the inequality and 
exploitation in the ghetto. This is not to say that merchants were not taking 
advantage of the poor. They were. There was predatory behavior, misleading 
advertisements, misrepresentation of prices, bait-and-switch advertising and sales, 
and fraud to be sure, but the ghetto’s destructive economic undertow trapped both 
the high-interest lenders as well as the borrowers. 136 Several studies, including 
contemporary studies by the FTC, Congress, and other academics, as well as recent 
analysis by historians, show that these lenders were not even making high profits.137 
The poor paid more and the sellers made less. Historian Louis Hyman found that 
“between bad debt losses, lawyers’ collection fees, higher insurance premiums, more 
accounting staff, and higher sales commissions, the higher costs of ghetto retailers 
accounted for 94 percent of the difference in the gross margins.”138 Poverty, 
segregation, and exclusion from robust credit markets meant high costs, low profits, 
and higher risks for everyone. Prices were high, quality was low, and profits were 
deceptively scarce.  
These lenders had higher loan losses and collection costs in the ghetto than 
they did in the suburbs because black families did not have a broad wealth 
infrastructure that whites enjoyed. These costs included hiring repo men and taking 
customers to court for unpaid bills. These collection tactics and the “unbelievably” 
 
133. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 181. 
134. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 121, at 157. 
135. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 125, at 33–34 (describing how eleven low-income 
market retailers obtained 2,690 judgments in 1966 resulting in 1,568 garnishments and 306 
repossessions. General market retailers reported only seventy judgments for the same year. The  
low-income retailers had one suit for every $2,599 of their net sales. The general market retailers 
averaged one suit for every $232,299 of sales.).  
136. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 121, at 179–92 (Caplovitz himself had misunderstood this 
dynamic and, when he offered reflections in the 1967 reprint of The Poor Pay More, he conceded that it 
was a mistake to see the ghetto credit merchants as “nefarious exploiters of the poor” and believed that 
a more thorough analysis could reveal more about the “economic constraints that operate on these 
men”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 125. 
137. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 181. 
138. See id. at 193.  
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high merchandise prices these lenders charged caused much suffering for 
borrowers, but they also cut into the lenders’ margins. They had to hire more staff, 
lost more money on default, and paid more to finance their own businesses—all 
these costs were passed on to borrowers.  
Situating these lenders in the broader framework makes the disparity even 
more striking. The cost of credit is related to the risk of lending. The higher the risk 
of default, the higher the interest rate. However, this is not a one-way causal link. 
Higher interest can make a loan higher to repay and therefore lead to higher default 
regardless of the risks associated with the borrower. Moreover, loan costs are not 
perfectly matched with the borrower’s ability to repay. Taking an analogy to today’s 
credit markets, all payday lenders charge the same high rate of interest to their 
borrowers. A hedge fund manager walking into Cash America would get the same 
300% APR loan as would a Wal-Mart employee. Of course, a hedge fund manager 
will not need an emergency loan of $500 because he can “borrow” the cash from 
his own holdings at no cost at all. If he is truly cash-poor, perhaps he could use his 
social capital to borrow $500 again at no cost from his network of wealthy friends 
or family. These are crude generalizations, but they largely match the demographic 
data of the wealthy and the poor—the wealthy tend to have wealthy friends and 
family and the poor tend to have similarly poor social networks. Thus, the cost of 
credit differs for the hedge fund manager and the Wal-Mart employee not because 
of the underwriting of the lender they go to, but because they have access to 
different types of lenders. A hedge fund employee, if he is going to borrow, will 
borrow large sums of money either from the Capital Markets, his investors, or the 
Federal Reserve if he owns a bank.139 These loans will likely not even be loans, but 
bond sales, equity transfers, or just investments. The American poet Ogden Nash 
put it this way: “[O]ne rule which woe betides the banker who fails to heed it; Never 
lend any money to anybody unless they don’t need it.”140 
On the other end of the income ladder, the poor pay most for small sums of 
credit. Due to a variety of forces, including bank conglomeration, redlining, and the 
deregulation of state usury laws, poor communities do not have access to small 
credit from banks. As such, their only option for a loan is to borrow from a high-
cost title lender, payday lender, or pawn broker. This is the market in which they 
operate. To take an example in the middle, a middle-class office worker who wants 
to purchase a second car has an altogether different credit market to which she can 
turn than the hedge fund manager or the minimum wage employee. She can take 
out a home equity line of credit, a small loan from her bank, or liquidate any 401(k) 
stock holdings she might have at a penalty. These options cost more than what the 
wealthy pay for credit—to the extent they even need it—and much less than what 
the poor pay. A home equity loan costs less than 10% APR and can be structured 
 
139. MEHRA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, 
AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2015). 
140. Ogden Nash, Bankers Are Just Like Anybody Else, Except Richer, NEW YORKER MAG., 
Dec. 7, 1935, at 41. 
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to be paid over the life of a home mortgage. Compare this to a payday loan or a title 
loan that must be repaid in a short time period and whose interest rate is anywhere 
from 300% of the total loan to 2000%.  
Thus, ghetto residents were paying more not just because they were higher 
risk borrowers, but because they operated in a higher risk credit market. Segregation 
had cordoned off the riskiest borrowers. Large national chains could avoid 
impoverished black neighborhoods entirely, and thus avoid the higher costs of 
underwriting, servicing, and collecting, which is exactly what they were doing. But 
not all of these borrowers were poor credit risks. In fact, with government insurance 
akin to what had undergirded the suburban credit market, residents of inner-city 
ghettos would also have been low-default borrowers. As it was, they paid more for 
loans, which meant a greater debt burden, and higher default. This then cost lenders 
more, further driving up prices.  
Suburban consumer lenders could offer lower interest because of lower risks, 
and lower risks made for more profitable lending, which drove down prices even 
more. Because their loans were predictable, they could be securitized and sold into 
the secondary markets, which lowered their risk even more. Higher risk and 
geographic isolation, or more accurately racial segregation that led to geographic 
isolation and higher risks, prevented installment lenders from participating in the 
robust credit markets that were driving down credit prices in the suburbs. It was the 
secondary markets that were the main engines of the credit markets, and installment 
lenders did not participate in secondary markets.141 Ghetto lenders paid more for 
capital because they could not sell their loans into the secondary market. The loans 
were too risky because black families did not have access to the network that 
lowered risks. They were stuck in an ancient debt market while the rest of the 
country had taken off into the modern world of risk sharing, secondary markets, 
and large finance companies that all worked to lower the risks and the costs of debt.  
Meanwhile, a virtuous credit cycle had taken hold in American suburbs. But 
the network did not work without all of the pieces in place. This revolving credit 
market that had taken shape among retailers outside of the ghetto meant a lower 
burden for customers and lower default rates. The black ghetto was not part of this 
infrastructure. Americans lived in two different worlds of credit—separate and 
unequal. But the equal protection provisions of the Civil Rights Acts had not been 
designed to address the type of discrimination that had led to the Jim Crow credit 
market. In other words, color-blind laws and legal prohibitions on de jure 
discrimination did nothing to lower the costs of installment credit. 
In the aftermath of the riots, the Banking and Currency Committee in the 
Senate held two separate hearings to discuss the problem of the poor paying more 
and what could be done about it. Senator Proxmire, a Wisconsin Democrat, led the 
hearings. Proxmire was an incorruptible reformer who was as committed a 
 
141. See Saule Omarova & Bob Hockett, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 
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policymaker in the cause of fixing inequalities as any other, but he was a hawk when 
it came to public spending and a dogmatic believer in the power of small business 
as the lifeblood of the country.142 Proxmire expressed “outrage” at the injustices 
faced by ghetto consumers, and he believed that the government must play a role 
in alleviating the suffering.143 Proxmire and the other members of his committee 
expressed genuine puzzlement that market competition had not brought down 
prices in the ghetto. Yet in testimony after testimony, government agencies, 
academics, and economists explained that these lenders were not making profits 
even as they charged exorbitant prices. The legislators seemed to understand that 
the ghetto lending economy created a cycle of high prices and lack of competition. 
They understood that the cycle must break somehow and that the “economic illness 
of the ghetto” required a strong cure.144 Yet when they began to discuss the antidote, 
they honed in on getting more black banks, credit unions, and lenders in the 
ghetto.145  
In the end, the Congressional hearings made three specific findings. First, 
rioters targeted white-owned establishments.146 Second, the rioters were targeting 
installment lenders.147 Congress based future policy on these first two findings. Yet 
there was a third finding the report supported that Congress ignored or forgot when 
it came to crafting the policy response. The third finding was that these lenders 
were not profiting. It simply costs more to lend in the ghetto because of the 
structure of the segregated credit market. This was the finding that each report 
confirmed even as it confounded the legislators. There were no Bull Connor 
lenders. They were no George Baileys, but they were not predators. However, the 
policymakers, intending no ill will, but lacking a political mandate, urged policies 
that ignored these findings. Without addressing this finding, Congress’s response 
was to keep the Jim Crow market intact and to throw more lenders into its maw, as 
though the lender’s race would somehow change the fundamental economy. 
In the end, after hearing testimony to the contrary, the senators misdiagnosed 
the problem in ghetto lending as one of white institutions exploiting the black 
ghetto. While “white-owned stores were burned and looted,” said New York 
Republican Senator Jacob Javits, “‘soul brother’ establishments were spared.”148 
Indeed, there was testimony bolstering this finding. Many black businesses even put 
signs up in their windows during riots to identify themselves as “soul brother” 
 
142. Sen. Proxmire wrote about his belief in small business. See, e.g., WILLIAM PROXMIRE, CAN 
SMALL BUSINESS SURVIVE? (1964). 
143. See Consumer Credit and the Poor 1, supra note 117, at 6–7. 
144. Id. at 17–20. 
145. See id. at 80–85; see also Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis: Hearing Before the  
S. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, 151, 324–27 
(1968) [hereinafter Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis]; U.S. SENATOR PROXMIRE REPORTS TO 
YOU FROM WASHINGTON (1969), microformed on P91-4833 (Wis. Historical Soc’y). 
146. Supra note 145. 
147. Id.  
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establishments.149 However, this was tangentially related to the problem of the Jim 
Crow credit markets. Nevertheless, the senators converged on a plan to simply 
throw more black banks and lenders into this unequal credit market. It was already 
clear, however, that the cause of the onerous debt terms was not the lenders’ race 
but the lenders’ costs. The misreading of the problem as a lack of enough black 
lenders would lead to decades of misguided policy. But at least in the aftermath of 
the late 1960s “urban crisis,” Congress intended for such programs to work 
alongside other more robust anti-poverty measures.150  
Senator Javits put forward a plan to spur black-owned small business, but he 
emphasized that only a robust federal intervention aimed specifically at the ghetto 
could reverse the trend of decline because “no conceivable increase in the gross 
national product would stir these backwaters” without targeted assistance.151 
President Johnson’s Small Business Administration (SBA) Director, Howard  
J. Samuels, said that the “inner cities of this country will be dead economically” and 
would remain “forever ghettos” unless blacks became “owners of American 
businesses.”152 The SBA’s response was a small business lending program called 
Project OWN, which ran alongside a larger War on Poverty program. Samuels 
promoted a program of “compensatory capitalism” aimed at the “economic 
emancipation” of the black population.153 John Jacob of the Washington Urban 
League believed that credit card issuers discriminated against blacks and suggested 
instead a “credit card for the poor—extended by a black credit card company in the 
black community.”154  
An avid believer in small business, Proxmire put his faith in credit unions.155 
Proxmire introduced a bill after the hearings that he said was “designed to help the 
poor break out of this vicious cycle” by “authorizing a strong federal program to 
encourage the formation of credit unions and consumer counseling programs for 
the poor.”156 The bill was a continuation of Project Moneywise, which created 218 
 
149. See Michael Zweig, Black Capitalism and Ownership of Property in Harlem (Stony Brook, 
Working Paper No. 16, 1970) (explaining how a study of Harlem found that more than eighty-five 
percent of the businesses and properties in Harlem were owned by outsiders or nonresidents of 
Harlem). 
150. See Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 428.  
151. Id. at 9, 13.  
152. Id. at 89–91. 
153. Id. at 94–95; see also ROBERT WEEMS, BUSINESS IN BLACK AND WHITE 89–109 (2009) 
(describing how in 1967, SBA chief, Howard J. Samuels created “Project OWN” as the government’s 
minority business aid program. The program was intended to funnel loans to black and white 
enterprises in ghetto areas. Though Johnson had supported the program, his heart was not into it and 
it seemed that he was only using minority enterprise as “a crisis management” tool to deal with unrest. 
Largely a political ploy, the program was not robust—by the end of 1968, only 5.7 percent of SBA 
money went to minority businesses.). 
154. See Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 236. 
155. Proxmire even wrote a book committed to small business. See PROXMIRE, supra note 142. 
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credit unions in poverty-stricken areas with the help of “indigenous leaders.”157 The 
program’s director said that the goal was for these credit unions to use consumer 
education and to rely on the “latent savings in the community” to build wealth.158 
Of course, there were few savings, and such a plan had been tried for a hundred 
years without any results.  
By 1968, most of these credit unions were struggling to remain viable, and the 
program was nearing its end, but Proxmire was still convinced that credit unions 
were the solution. As he told the credit union industry representative, “[W]e really 
count on credit unions heavily to solve a large part of this problem.” 159 After all, he 
said, “[T] his is one of the purposes for which credit unions were initially established, 
in order that people with modest incomes could establish credit and be able to 
operate in this free enterprise economy.”160 The myth of the credit union was that 
through local control of collective money, a marginalized community could 
eventually gather enough capital to join the economy. But this was not actually how 
credit unions had created the middle-class—they had done it through federally 
subsidized mortgage loans. However, the allure of this banking model as an answer 
to poverty was so strong that even the learned chair of the Senate Banking 
Committee, an honest reformer who understood the forces of this deviant ghetto 
market, could not break the credit union’s spell as the answer to poverty. Proxmire 
knew that these urban installment lenders were not making money, a fact he 
repeated many times during the hearings. He also understood that the problem’s 
heart was concentrated poverty and not a few mischievous lenders’ profitable 
exploitation. Yet he maintained a somewhat magical faith that locally owned credit 
unions would break the “vicious cycle.” 161 Perhaps it was because any other 
solution was politically impractical or cost too much, or perhaps he believed that 
credit unions could overcome these obstacles through their community 
commitment. To Proxmire’s credit, this was only his first proposal, with many more 
to follow.  
Just a few years later, Proxmire honed in on eliminating credit discrimination 
and pushed for passage of the 1970 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the 1974 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA).162 The burgeoning women’s rights 
movement pushed these laws through Congress. These equal credit laws eliminated 
race and gender identification from loan applications and required lenders to use 
objective credit scores instead of identity. Before their passage, even affluent 
women could not get a credit card. Women of means were being denied credit due 
 
157. See Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 74; see also Consumer Credit 
and the Poor 1, supra note 117, at 30–38. 
158. See Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 74–82, 101–06; see also 
Consumer Credit and the Poor 1, supra note 117, at 5–6, 34–36. 
159. Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 134. 
160. See id. For a treatment of the Credit Union myth, see BARADARAN, supra note 139. 
161. See Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 134. 
162. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL 
WEALTH GAP 149 (2017). 
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solely to their gender and not their ability to repay. Wealthy black consumers also 
suffered from such blatant discrimination, however, the majority of blacks suffered 
from a different breed of discrimination as described above. These 
antidiscrimination provisions also applied to minorities, but the exclusion of 
minorities from credit was not the same as what women faced. Creditors indeed 
discriminated against creditworthy women and blacks based solely on negative 
stereotypes. But for blacks, discrimination created a plethora of other conditions 
that materially affected their default risk. The solution to the Jim Crow credit market 
was not to simply remove the “whites only” signs. Racism was the problem’s root 
cause, but over decades, that racism had entrenched a segregated and 
undercapitalized ghetto economy that was responsible for much of the disparity. In 
order to reach parity, that economy or the segregated black ghetto itself would have 
to be disassembled. Unable or unwilling to eliminate the ghetto credit market in its 
entirety, Congress focused exclusively on credit application discrimination. 
However, nondiscrimination laws would not and could not change the 
fundamentals of the Jim Crow credit markets. Lenders simply found other means 
of avoiding lending to blacks—they used zip codes as a proxy for race.163 Due to 
decades of racial segregation and the subsequent reinforcement of this racial 
geography through redlining, zip codes were almost perfect indicators of a 
community’s racial and economic makeup.164 
Misunderstanding the problem entirely, the FTC encouraged lawmakers to 
create “financial education” programs so that blacks would not enter into such 
exploitative contracts.165 The FTC’s own detailed study of lending disparity found 
that the poor knew that they were paying too much for credit, but that they lacked 
other options.166 Caplovitz also concluded his study by proposing financial 
education, suggesting that ghetto consumers should be taught to shop at retailers 
outside of the ghetto.167 Ultimately, Caplovitz conceded, however, that all these 
suggestions would be futile “until poverty itself is eradicated.”168 Financial education 
is useful insofar as consumers are making bad choices because they do not know of 
better options. However, high-cost borrowing is usually a result of a lack of better 
choices. In a survey of ghetto consumers, only 15% thought it was a “good idea” to 
buy goods on credit.169 The rest said it was a good idea only in certain circumstances 
or a bad idea altogether.170 When asked why, more than half of those surveyed said 
that “it costs too much” or “you pay too much in carrying charges.”171 Though these 
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consumers seemed to understand the exact nature of their problem, they admitted 
that this was “the only way poor people could buy.”172 Financial education is still 
proposed as a solution to structural problems despite several convincing studies that 
financial education does not work.173 
In reality, all of these solutions were incomplete and shortsighted. The only 
way to adequately counter credit disparity was to eliminate the wealth inequality 
between the ghetto and the suburbs which would eliminate the Jim Crow credit 
market. One path toward equality was to integrate the credit market, which is what 
the Kerner Commission report had suggested as the only solution to the problem 
of inequality.174 If black borrowers could integrate into the general market and large 
retailers were allowed to do individual credit evaluations, then black borrowers 
could have paid less for credit. This would have allowed lenders to diversify their 
risks, thus driving down prices for everyone. Increased diversity would even have 
been preferable for the large finance companies, as most lenders prefer some 
borrowers who pay off their balance and many who roll over their balances and pay 
interest. This is exactly what secondary markets had wrought outside of the red 
lines. However, integrating a zip code-based credit market would have been difficult 
to do without physical integration, which was simply not politically feasible.175  
The other alternative was to give black residents a direct capital infusion to 
jump-start wealth creation and break the poverty cycle directly. State law and policy 
created the racial wealth gap, and so a reversal of the wealth gap through a program 
of reparations would have been justifiable. But, while forced integration would have 
been unfeasible and unlikely, subsidizing black communities was inconceivable. 
Moreover, such a race-based redistribution of wealth had to contend with the 
bedrock principle of the civil rights movement: color-blind equality. The promise 
of equal protection before the law encapsulated in the Civil Rights and Voting 
Rights Acts opened doors to full participation in the economy and the democracy, 
but it gave the courts and legislatures the rhetorical and legal tools to close the doors 
to any claims for redress of historic injustice. Colorblindness and “equality” before 
the law was often used against black demands for justice. The theory is encapsulated 
in Chief Justice Roberts’ statement in 2004 that “the way to stop discrimination on 
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis on race.”176 Demands for 
racial equality taken from the theoretical underpinnings of the civil rights laws have 
been used by litigants with the blessing of the Supreme Court to declare government 
action attempting to address past injustice as unconstitutional.177 
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BLACK CAPITALISM 
During the 1968 election, each presidential candidate had a platform to 
address the racial wealth gap through economic self-determination. Prior to his 
assassination, Robert Kennedy was the Democratic frontrunner. Among the 
candidates, his Community Development program was the most holistic.178 It 
included tax incentives for businesses, Community Development Corporations, job 
training programs, and government funding for poverty relief programs. Other 
candidates had similar black capitalism programs. Hubert Humphrey, the eventual 
Democratic candidate, called his proposal “Black Entrepreneurship: Need and 
Opportunity for Government Help” and proposed plans geared towards 
“enhanc[ing] black pride and quell[ing] black insurgency.”179 His plan included more 
funding for businesses through the SBA programs that had been started during the 
Johnson administration.180 Furthermore, his plan called for the creation of an 
“urban development bank” to fund businesses in the ghetto.181 For Humphrey, 
black capitalism was a part of his reform package, which included a continuation of 
War on Poverty programs. In the presidential race, Humphrey referred to Nixon’s 
black capitalism plan as “double talk.” When Nixon promised voters that his 
program would cost little, Humphrey retorted, “Of course it will take money. 
Talking about black capitalism without capital is just kiting political checks.”182  
Nonetheless, Nixon’s black capitalism program was a vital part of his Southern 
strategy, which used race as a wedge issue without actually talking about race.183 
Other scholars have noted Nixon’s racist dog whistling on “law and order” as a 
signal to attract white voters who were fearful of blacks.184 Nixon’s economic 
program sought to link black poverty to welfare dependency and to resist demands 
for integration or reparations by advocating “black capitalism” instead. By using the 
 
regard to its disparate coverage, is now unconstitutional. Its arguments have a good deal of force. In 
the covered jurisdictions, “‘[v]oter turnout and registration rates . . . now approach parity. Blatantly 
discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at 
unprecedented levels.’ Northwest Austin, 557 U.S., at 202, 129 S.Ct. 2504. The tests and devices that 
blocked ballot access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 years.”). See also Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379 (1978) (“Accordingly, we would reverse the judgment 
of the Supreme Court of California holding the Medical School’s special admissions program 
unconstitutional and directing respondent’s admission, as well as that portion of the judgment enjoining 
the Medical School from according any consideration to race in the admissions process.”). 
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179. See WEEMS, supra note 153, at 91. 
180. Id. at 90–95, 107–09. 
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182. See Memorandum from Howard J. Samuels, Admin., Small Bus. Admin., to Matthew 
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racially neutral rhetoric of free market capitalism, he could reject government  
aid programs.  
Alan Greenspan, who served as Nixon’s economic advisor, addressed claims 
by black activists for reparations in a private campaign memo to candidate Nixon 
in 1967 called “The Urban Riots of the 1960s.” 185 He wrote that capitalism itself 
was under attack by demands made by black militants and that “ghetto riots have 
become a rallying cry for an attack upon America’s system of free enterprise and 
individual rights.”186 Greenspan outlined his reasoning:  
The critical question is, of course, whether the Negroes are correct in 
claiming that they have been exploited and that their violent reaction is the 
rational response. There can be little doubt that discrimination has been 
rampant. However, the charge of exploitation in the sense of value being 
extracted from the Negroes without their consent for the profit of the 
whites is clearly false . . . . This distinction between discrimination and 
exploitation is all the difference in the world. 187  
In other words, because whites had not profited directly from black misery, 
reparations should be rejected. Moreover, he underscored in the memo that any 
capitulation to demands for federal spending in the ghetto were a threat to free 
enterprise. 
Greenspan believed that the cries of exploitation were not only misguided, but 
had destroyed the status of the “more moderate old-line Negro civil rights leaders” 
and turned the black middle-class anti-capitalist.188 This was because black activists 
had misunderstood capitalism and the natural market of the ghetto and had 
erroneously and unfairly blamed whites for exploitation. He was correct when he 
said that “profit rates in slum areas are doubtless distressingly low considering the 
risks,” but he erred when he concluded based on that observation that the white 
community was not gaining any “advantage and profit” and that therefore cries of 
“injustice” were “erroneous.”189 He could not see that the same system that 
discriminated against blacks had brought benefits to whites. Nor did he 
acknowledge that for blacks who were being crushed by the ghetto debt trap, it 
could still feel like an “injustice” even though the lenders were not making direct 
profits. He rejected the liberal notion that “the Negro ghetto must be elevated to 
the level of affluence of middle-class America” because “this can only be done by 
massive governmental expenditures.”190 Instead, he advised Nixon to pursue 
programs to “help Negroes help themselves.”191  
 
185. See Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Townsend-Greenspan & Co., to Richard 
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Capitalist theory was used to fight basic antidiscrimination laws in Milton 
Friedman’s foundational 1962 book, “Capitalism and Freedom.” The intellectual 
father of neoliberalism opposed such laws as a violation of free market capitalism. 
He decried discrimination as a matter of bad taste but said that civil rights laws were 
an “interference with the freedom of individuals to enter into voluntary contracts 
with one another.”192 He compared laws prohibiting discrimination to laws 
requiring discrimination—it was all unjustified government intervention. Friedman 
believed that markets would themselves root out discrimination because it was 
costly and inefficient. Friedman claimed that anyone who opposed buying goods 
from black businessmen or employing black employees was expressing an 
inefficient preference and would therefore pay a higher price for that preference. 
Theoretically, this was true, but historically it was not. Because the ghetto had 
cordoned off a segment of risky borrowers, whites actually paid significantly less 
for goods, credit, and housing. Racial discrimination had not cost whites but had 
actually brought many advantages through all-white suburbs, such as lower 
competition for lucrative jobs, and for a time, even labor protections that benefited 
whites at the expense of blacks.193  
Friedman, Greenspan, and other market capitalists grounded their arguments 
in economic theory. They were chasing a libertarian vision of the economy, but what 
they were describing was a hypothetical future—it had no relationship to the actual 
lived experience of American history. This was a common trope of the Chicago 
school economists, which relied on models that often assumed perfect information 
and rational behavior and did not account for the decision-making flaws of average 
humans.194 The historical American reality was that blacks had never fully 
participated in free market capitalism and that whites had benefited from heavy 
government interventions that had worked to the direct disadvantage of blacks. The 
arteries of trade and commerce had not flown freely through the ghetto. At least 
not in the realm of credit and banking. The credit markets laid atop a federal 
government apparatus including guarantees, secondary markets, deposit insurance, 
and federal reserve support. The only places where those forces were not working 
were inside the ghettos. The ghetto itself had been an unnatural creation of anti-
market impositions of racist policies. Indeed, discrimination was incredibly costly, 
but only to blacks.  
The neoliberal faith in capitalism and market efficiency was rooted in an ideal 
much like the egalitarian principles of the founding documents. They were 
aspirational faiths, but they were not accurate descriptions of the real world. In 
theory, it was costly to refuse to buy products from blacks if they were offering the 
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same or lower prices. In reality, whites often refused to associate with blacks at any 
cost. Besides, even if discrimination did suddenly disappear, the broken markets of 
the ghetto would not. Discrimination had created macro market forces that were 
now operating on their own. Yet neoliberal dogma and market fundamentalism 
demanded adhesion to market theory, which meant an aversion to any and all 
“government intervention” aimed at black poverty. 
Barry Goldwater’s failed presidential run in 1964 was the watershed moment 
for libertarian market principles on the national political stage and created a 
movement that only grew stronger over time.195 Goldwater demanded smaller 
government involvement and spending in all spheres. Without spewing the racial 
animus of the George Wallace wing of his party, he opposed civil rights laws, 
integration, and any government program meant to address poverty—all in the 
name of free market capitalism. There is no reason to doubt that Goldwater was a 
true believer in market fundamentalism. However, Goldwater won back the South 
for the Republican Party based on his opposition to integration and civil rights. He 
used the principles of libertarianism as a weapon against racial equality and did so 
to court the votes of the white supremacist wing of the party.196 
Since any redress for past economic exclusion required heavy federal 
government action, an immediate libertarian backlash began to delegitimize all 
government action. Conservatives began to demand a bill of rights that guaranteed 
the right to free use of property, including the right to segregated neighborhoods. 
The movement could hardly be seen as anything but a direct response to the 
economic demands of the black movement and the government anti-poverty 
program.197 Nixon was not a libertarian—he expanded the federal bureaucracy and 
created more government agencies than any modern president—but he still 
opposed government interference of any kind when it came to integration or  
anti-poverty measures. Republican strategist Lee Atwater gave away the playbook 
in a 1981 interview: 
You start out in 1954 saying nig***, nig***, nig***. By 1968, you can’t say 
nig***—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, 
states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re 
 
195. See generally E.J. DIONNE JR., WHY THE RIGHT WENT WRONG: CONSERVATISM—FROM 
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talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are 
totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt more 
than whites.198 
The theory of economic dogma, which James Kwak has called “Economism,” 
began to be adhered to like a religious dogma and used to fight each and every 
government intervention to remedy past sins.199 Economism even provided a new 
justification for stark wealth inequality and exploitation. Inequality along racial lines 
has been a constant on the American scene, but different eras have justified it with 
different myths. Christianity was corrupted to hold that white men had a divine 
right—even duty—to subjugate and enslave blacks. When religious theory fell out 
of favor, social Darwinism and skull measurements held that blacks were an inferior 
species who had lost the evolutionary race and thus their subjugation was nature’s 
will. Now, economic theory held that “the free market” decreed that blacks hold 
the bottom rung because, for example, it was the laws of supply and demand that 
caused blacks to pay more for credit and the market that determined how much 
their labor was worth and that integration was anti-market. Any effort to change 
these markets were delegitimized and labeled as harmful government interference 
with what President Regan called “the magic of the marketplace.”200 And just as 
“God’s will” was difficult to challenge in the 1800s, so too was free market 
economic theory in the 1960s lest one be labeled a heretic or a communist.  
For the ascendant libertarians that were taking hold of American politics, the 
only acceptable remedy for a history of exclusion was black capitalism. But what 
these white policymakers surely meant by black capitalism was capitalism only for 
blacks. Government intervention in markets had been the norm as were 
government-imposed Jim Crow laws. Capitalism had not created the ghetto and 
black poverty—racist laws and state intervention in the markets had created both. 
There had never been free market capitalism for blacks. After years of exclusion, 
Jim Crow, segregation, and the deviant markets these state interventions had 
created, the Nixon administration was actually proposing that maintaining that 
segregated market was the remedy—that somehow by attaching the word “black” 
to “capitalism” would remedy past wrongs. 
Nixon unveiled his plan in a series of campaign ads and speeches. One ad, 
entitled “The Wrong Road,” showcased images of mostly brown and black poverty-
stricken faces and a sign saying “Government Checks Cashed Here.”201 In addition 
to this imagery, Nixon’s voice explained, “For the past five years we’ve been 
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deluged by programs for the unemployed—programs for the cities—programs for 
the poor. And we have reaped from these programs an ugly harvest of frustration, 
violence and failure across the land.”202 The rhetoric of this ad was a subtle 
subversion of the Kerner commission language, which called violence the harvest 
of racism. Now, according to Nixon, violence was a direct result of government 
aid—never mind that the violence preceded the poverty programs. At the end of 
the ad, as the music became more upbeat, and the camera panned across images of 
construction sites, a factory line, and a shipyard, Nixon pronounced, “We should 
enlist private enterprise to solve the problems of America.”203 In a subsequent ad 
called “Black Capitalism,” Nixon promised to save the ghetto with a “hand-up,” not 
a “handout.”204 More specifically, he promised “to get private enterprise into the 
ghetto and the ghetto into private enterprise.”205 He said that integration of the 
races must come, “but in order for it to come on sound and equal basis the black 
community has to build from within.”206 Presumably, he meant that blacks would 
have to work toward integration themselves as though segregation had been an act 
of nature, not a system imposed and enforced by racism and the government.207 
Nixon believed that the government’s “overpromising and under-producing” 
had caused the rioting and vowed “not [to] overpromise.”208 He was clear that the 
“federal government [did] not have the funds . . . to appropriate billions of dollars 
for our cities.”209 He believed that it was time to see what “private enterprise and 
individuals” could do to “provide hope” and “reconciliation.”210 In a speech called 
Human Dignity, he explained that the country needed to “go beyond civil rights.”211 
Actually, in the initial draft of the speech in Nixon’s presidential files, the speech 
said, “Forget civil rights.”212 Nixon highlighted the word “forget” and replaced it 
with “go beyond.”213 The message was the same. He said that “Civil Rights is no 
longer an issue” and that Jim Crow and segregation were over. 214 To him, it was 
time to focus on self-determination and “dignity.” But, by dignity, Nixon was 
communicating that blacks needed to learn to survive on their own and that asking 
 
202. Id.  
203. Id.  
204. BARADARAN, supra note 139. 
205. Id.  
206. Id.  
207. Both commercials in Nixon archives: https://ws.onehub.com/folders/nwsx31jv (start at 
55:43).  
208.  
209. Transcript Q&A with Students at the University of Oregon, File 8, ARRA 24, 1968. 
(transcript) (on file with the Richard Nixon Presidential Library). 
210. Id. 
211. David Lindsey Snead, Eisenhower and the Gaither Report: The Influence of a Committee 
of Experts on National Security Policy in the Late 1950s (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Virginia). 
212. President Richard Nixon, Human Dignity (Apr. 6, 1968) (draft speech) (on file with 
author). 
213. Id.  
214. Id.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395876
Clean Final Edit_Baradaran.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/18/19  8:43 PM 
2019] JIM CROW CREDIT 137 
the government for help was depriving them of their dignity. “At long last, the 
Negro has his bill of rights—but he cannot pay the bill.”215  
In a radio program in April of 1968, Nixon promised “more black ownership, 
black pride, black jobs, black opportunity, and yes, black power, in the best, the 
constructive sense of that often misapplied term.”216 Nixon essentially borrowed 
his rhetoric from Malcolm X who had stated that the “black man should be focusing 
his every effort toward building his own business, and decent homes for himself” 
although Nixon left out the part where Malcolm had said, “[S]how me a capitalist, 
I’ll show you a bloodsucker.”217 He also ignored the part of the black power 
platform that demands land, reparations, and political sovereignty. Notably, Nixon 
enthusiastically embraced voluntary segregation, self-reliance, and private 
enterprise. Nixon and his advisors intended black capitalism to completely replace 
Johnson’s anti-poverty programs. According to a Nixon biographer, he “presented 
black capitalism as both a panacea and a fait accompli.”218 Nixon’s speechwriter, 
Raymond K. Price, explained that the path forward involved replacing “the Negro 
habit of dependence” with “one of independence” and “personal responsibility.”  
 According to Nixon, the history of the black community was a perpetual 
state of dependency on government largesse. This perspective was inconceivably 
shortsighted. In reality, the black community had been trying to “help themselves” 
for generations, but they were repeatedly blocked by racist laws and thwarted by 
racist policy. The meager “handouts” had only begun a few years prior, and most 
notably, the ghetto was the only pocket in the entire American landscape that had 
never received government subsidies. In fact, the complete and utter lack of any 
“handouts” had created the ghetto in the first place; it had only ever had an 
economic system of unchecked and unmitigated capitalism. Yet with the eruption 
of violence, policymakers proposed a cure to end the ghetto’s ailments: blacks must 
learn how to be capitalists. 
Black capitalism was a hit with the media and the voters and won Nixon the 
Republican primary and the White House. It all sounded great to the press. The 
Wall Street Journal and Time magazine embraced Nixon’s black capitalism rhetoric 
by calling it “thoughtful” and “promising.”219 Even the Democrat-leaning New 
York Times, which usually showed the same disdain for the president that the 
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president showed for it, endorsed black capitalism. The paper’s associate editor, 
Tom Wicker, wrote, “Richard Nixon’s radio speech on the need for the 
development of Black Capitalism and ownership in the ghetto could prove to be 
more constructive than anything yet said by other Presidential candidates on the 
crisis of the cities.” 220  
Republicans embraced black capitalism wholeheartedly. Nelson Rockefeller’s 
strategist called black capitalism “a stroke of political genius,” and Rockefeller 
himself supported the idea.221 Conservative New York Senator James L. Buckley 
praised the “spirit” of “militant black leaders who have been preaching black 
initiative, black capitalism, and yes, black power.”222 Buckley aligned black 
capitalism with a libertarian small government philosophy, and he proposed that the 
program need not go to the entire black populace because “scattered success can 
give universal hope.”223 This was the key objective: the government did not need to 
underwrite black businesses, just the community’s hope in black businesses. Nixon’s 
top aide, John Ehlrichman, explained that “[w]ith a relatively small budget impact, 
this is one program which can put the Administration in good light with Blacks 
without carrying a severe negative impact on the majority community, as is often 
the case with civil rights issues.”224 The budget certainly was small as was the impact. 
Nixon and his administration placed more emphasis on black capitalism in 
advertising and press response than in policymaking.225  
In 1969, President Nixon signed Executive Order 11458 establishing the 
Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) within the Department of 
Commerce. The OMBE was not allocated any direct funds; instead, it was instructed 
to seek private business contributions and help from other federal agencies. In real 
political terms, this lack of direct funding meant that the “OMBE was given 
responsibility for ‘advising,’ ‘encouraging,’ ‘mobilizing,’ ‘evaluating,’ ‘collecting’ 
information, and ‘coordinating’ activities,” but beyond this vague mission, it did not 
have a mandate or a budget with which to make unilateral decisions or to make any 
loans or grants.226 Any money on the OMBE received came from the Office of 
Economic Opportunity’s (OEO) anti-poverty budget.227 Nonetheless, the House 
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Select Committee on Small Business immediately opposed the agency, calling it 
“discrimination in reverse.”228 
By 1970, a recession had hit the country. The unemployment statistics were so 
bad by 1971 that the Nixon administration decided to stop reporting them. The new 
aspiring entrepreneurs in the ghetto suffered most acutely as inflation soared, and 
banks closed the credit pipeline. A black accounting firm in New York summarized 
the situation by explaining that “the people least likely to succeed in business were 
trying to make it at a time when seasoned businessmen were having trouble.”229 
The least controversial and most durable black capitalism program was the 
1970 Minority Bank Deposit Program (MBDP). Ever since Washington 
policymakers had linked ghetto rioting with credit exploitation, multiple programs 
had been proposed to fix credit inequalities. These proposed programs involved 
creating new banking institutions, providing loan guarantees, capital infusions, or 
Marshall Plans for the ghetto. The Nixon administration rejected all of these 
proposals, choosing to ask government agencies to deposit their accounts in black 
banks instead. In 1968, a black banker remarked that these agency deposits would 
not provide a good basis for financing banks in the ghetto due to their instability.230 
Even so, the agency deposits occurred. The initial goal was to encourage federal 
agencies to deposit $100 million of their accounts in black banks, but the yield was 
a mere $35 million by 1971.231  
The first agency to volunteer, the Post Office, announced that it would 
deposit $75 million in black banks. 232 In reality, it only deposited $150,000.233 Even 
so, they kept this small sum rotating through the different banks. “One businessman 
quipped about the deposit, ‘It was like me saying I’ll lend you $365,000 for the next 
year and then lending you a dollar every morning and taking it back every night.’”234 
These deposits were the same type that had been crippling the black banks for years 
and thus were not the deposits that the black banks desperately needed. The 
president of Unity Bank in Roxbury complained that the Post Office even refused 
to bring the money to the bank: “They expected us to hire a security service to 
collect deposits that we couldn’t even make any money on.”235 After complaints 
about the added cost burden of postal deposits, the program promised the banks 
that it would send more valuable deposits from other agencies, which they did. 
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However, all of the government deposits ended up costing banks more than they 
were worth.  
An expert of political détente, Nixon used black capitalism to let out just 
enough steam from the pent-up pressure cooker of rage in the poverty-stricken 
ghetto to squelch the brewing revolution.236 Ultimately, black capitalism was weak 
and entirely unresponsive to the needs of the black community. But it was vague 
enough to offer just enough hope to cool the boiling anger just as it was about to 
spill over. With black capitalism alone, Nixon weakened the black radicals’ demand 
for black power, abandoned Johnson’s anti-poverty programs, maintained his 
opposition to integration, and even won the support of many black leaders.  
The promise of black capitalism was so politically appealing that every 
presidential administration since that of Nixon has adopted it in one form or 
another, be it “community capitalism,” “enterprise zones,” or “minority enterprise.” 
President Reagan called black business and black banking the “key to black 
economic progress” and promised that black banks could have a “beneficial 
multiplier effect” in black ghettos.237 President Clinton created robust legislation to 
promote “community empowerment” through banking—an infrastructure that 
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama bolstered and maintained.238 Even 
the precedent-breaking President Trump has followed suit. In his “New Deal with 
Black America,” Trump promised tax breaks for inner-city investments and credit 
support for black businesses.239 Amidst a widening racial wealth gap, the promotion 
of black banking and microenterprise has been a consistent policy Band-Aid. These 
“solutions” have turned out to be a decoy response to the fundamental challenge 
of overcoming America’s legacy of slavery and institutional racism. Instead of 
providing meaningful financial inclusion, key policymakers continue to believe that 
bankers will save the ghetto. The next section will describe the two most pivotal 
legislative acts aimed to foster financial inclusion and to reverse the effects of 
redlining and describe how each was rooted in Nixon’s black capitalism 
infrastructure and the neoliberal understanding of market supremacy. As a result of 
the flawed premise of both of these acts, they have been ineffective yet championed 
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TWO POLICIES FOR TWO AMERICAS: THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 
AND THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ACT 
President Reagan enthusiastically supported black business even while cutting 
poverty aid. Speaking to the NAACP in 1981, he praised black business leaders and 
said that minority business development “is a key to black economic progress. 
Black-owned businesses are especially important in neighborhood economies where 
the dollars, as I said, spent have a beneficial multiplier effect.”240 President Reagan 
linked his belief in market deregulation with civil rights, declaring “[a] free economy 
helps defeat discrimination by fostering opportunity for all.”241 President Reagan 
promised that lower taxes and fewer regulations would revitalize the area and attract 
more small businesses. He referred to inner city ghettos as “enterprise zones.” In 
fact, the 1984 GOP platform called on Congress to pass legislation to help 
“enterprise zones, to draw a green line of prosperity around the red-lined areas of 
our cities and to help create jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities.”242 The civil 
rights plank in the 1988 GOP platform promised to “increase, strengthen, and 
reinvigorate minority business development efforts to afford socially and 
economically disadvantaged individuals the opportunity for full participation in our 
free enterprise system.”243 Reagan did not offer any specific plans to create jobs or 
opportunities in the ghetto besides tax cuts. Based on Milton Friedman’s free 
market theories, the presumption was that unrestrained capitalism would eradicate 
racial inequality.  
In a 1982 speech, Reagan declared that for the rest of his administration, the 
first week of October would be “Minority Enterprise Development Week.”244 In 
1983, he issued an executive order requiring federal agencies to provide annual goals 
on increasing procurements from minority businesses.245 Even though the theory 
and infrastructure of black capitalism continued unabated for decades, its original 
aim as a remedy to the ghetto economy and a response to the black power 
movement changed over time. For example, both President Carter and President 
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Reagan passed initiatives to include women in most of the SBA and MDBA grant 
programs.246 President Reagan’s Women’s Business Ownership Act of 1988 
mandated that the SBA provide additional aid to female-owned enterprise.247 
Originally, black capitalism initiatives were designed to provide a politically 
neutralizing response to one of the biggest racial uprisings in history. Now, 
however, these programs provide business support for all minority groups, 
including women. The theory of black enterprise ceased to be discussed as an anti-
poverty measure and certainly not as a black power initiative. Instead, it transformed 
into positive role models for minority communities and “diversifying” white-male 
dominated fields.  
Along the way, the legislature incorporated features of the black capitalism 
program into law. For example, in 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) as a response to the savings 
and loan crisis. The act primarily focused on regulating the failed thrift sector, but 
it also included a provision about minority banks. Section 308 of FIRREA, entitled 
Preserving Minority Ownership of Minority Financial Institutions, contained the first 
legislative decree concerning minority banks.248 Section 308 did not authorize any 
financial help to black banks, but rather it instructed the FDIC, the Treasury, and 
the now defunct Office of Thrift Supervision to pay attention to the sector.249 More 
specifically, Section 308 instructed the agencies to work toward preserving “the 
present number” and the “character” of minority deposit institutions.250 For 
example, in the event a minority institution was threatened by failure, the law 
instructed bank regulators to ensure that the bank’s minority nature was preserved 
by, if possible, merging it with another minority bank in the region. The act also 
mandated that federal regulators provide “training, technical assistance and 
education programs” to all minority banks as well as to work towards promoting 
and encouraging new minority deposit insurance.251  
The act constituted the first time that Congress provided a legal definition for 
minority banks. The definition itself revealed just how muddled the issue of black 
banking had become and how far the concept of black capitalism had migrated from 
its initial aim. During the era of Jim Crow and segregation, a legal definition for a 
black bank was unnecessary—a black bank served black customers in a black 
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community. When Nixon issued Executive Order 11458 establishing the OMBE 
and the black capitalism framework, he did not include a legal definition.252 
Everyone knew that he was talking about establishing black-owned institutions in 
the ghetto.253 However, after the initial crisis had passed, the Nixon administration 
began speaking more vaguely about “minority business enterprise.” Some observers 
believed this was due to Nixon’s desire to court the Mexican vote. Notably, his only 
minority appointment to his administration was conservative Mexican Hilary 
Sandoval to head the SBA.254  
With the revision of the black capitalism program in Executive Order 11625, 
Nixon defined “minority business enterprise” for the first time in 1971 as a business 
that was “owned or controlled by one or more socially or economically 
disadvantaged persons. Such disadvantage may arise from cultural, racial, chronic 
economic circumstances or background or other similar cause. Such persons 
include, but are not limited to, Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Spanish-speaking 
Americans, American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.”255 Unsurprisingly, this vague 
and convoluted definition offers little clarity. Such a definition was to be expected 
from a program that began as an ill-defined political response to an acute national 
crisis. Other than being ambiguous, the definition also revealed the perplexity and 
double-speak of the black capitalism federal policy framework. Section 308(b) 
defined a minority institution as a bank that is 51% owned by “one or more socially 
and economically disadvantaged individuals.”256 For public banks, it required a 
majority of stockholders to be “socially and economically disadvantaged.”257 The 
statute did not go on to define what this meant or how it should be interpreted. To 
further the confusion, when the act defined minority “cooperatives” or “mutually 
owned minority banks” in the very next sentence of the section, it changed the 
definition of a minority bank to one where a “majority of the Board of Directors, 
account holders, and the community which [the bank] services is predominantly 
minority.”258 The act then defined “minority” as “any black American, Native 
American, Hispanic American, or Asian American.”259 The act underscores the 
conflicting agendas that bred black capitalism by defining a minority institution 
simultaneously as one that serves economically disadvantaged individuals and one 
that serves a defined group of minorities.  
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 Faced with conflicting definitions in the statute, the regulators simply 
created their own definition in order to enforce Congress’s mandate. For example, 
the FDIC determined that a minority deposit institution was one that is majority 
owned by U.S. citizens who are “Black American, Asian American, Hispanic 
American, or Native American.”260 The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) did  
the same.261  
President Clinton brought some much-needed clarity to black capitalism 
policy as he revitalized the programs. He talked about black banks the way that 
Nixon initially had, as a means of confronting black ghetto poverty, but he did so 
without mentioning race. President Clinton, calling himself a “New Democrat,” 
proposed a “third way” platform between Republicans and Democrats. Clinton 
slashed welfare benefits, which he believed caused a cycle of dependence.262 Clinton 
expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit, Head Start, and increased minimum wage, 
which he said properly “emphasize[d] work and independence.”263 However, 
Clinton tried to steer the party away from Johnson’s war against poverty. In fact, 
both Clinton’s and Carter’s rhetoric and policies on racial equality followed 
President Nixon’s lead as opposed to their Democratic predecessors. 
Clinton embedded his urban poverty programs firmly in neoliberal market 
ideology. The country’s racial ghettos, whose walls still remained intact, came to be 
referred to as enterprise zones, emerging markets, and niche industries. These were 
places that could certainly yield a profit if creative entrepreneurs looked hard 
enough. Clinton passed a series of laws that provided tax inducements to encourage 
private firms to invest in impoverished communities.264 Essentially, Clinton’s 
policies provided an incentive-based boost to Nixon’s black capitalism framework. 
Nixon had tried—with minimal effort and minimal success—to induce large white-
owned firms to voluntarily contribute to black businesses. Even the firms 
themselves had viewed their involvement as charitable and entirely voluntary. In 
contrast, Clinton’s program did not appeal to philanthropic aims at all. Instead, he 
promised profits. Clinton’s Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) secretary, Andrew Cuomo, told reporters, it “is not about charity. It’s about 
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investment.”265 Academics and progressive reformers agreed that ghetto poverty 
was a result of misaligned market incentives and could only be addressed through 
private enterprise. For example, influential Harvard professor Michael Porter wrote 
that instead of aid or social investments, the only way to build the economy of the 
ghetto was “through private, for-profit initiatives and investment based on 
economic self-interest and genuine advantage . . . . The cornerstone of such a model 
is to identify and exploit the competitive advantages of inner cities that will translate 
into truly profitable businesses.”266 Ghettos were labeled “emerging markets” and 
“untapped markets,” which contained hidden opportunities that creative profit-
oriented private enterprises could exploit. This rhetoric emphasized a win-win of 
profits for the entrepreneurs and poverty alleviation for the ghetto. Policymakers 
sought to fix all of the ghetto’s problems with entrepreneurs, instead of working to 
break down the walls of segregation and the poverty trap. 
Because the Supreme Court found remedying past wrongs to be 
unconstitutional, an era of colorblindness ensued.267 As a result, these programs 
directed towards the country’s ghettos had to be race neutral. Black capitalism 
became “community capitalism.” A 1997 conference, entitled the American 
Assembly, brought together business and community leaders and academics to 
discuss poverty and community development. The final conference report defined 
community capitalism as a “for-profit, business-driven expansion of investment, 
job creation, and economic opportunities in distressed communities, with 
government and the community sectors playing key supportive roles.”268 Vice 
President Al Gore endorsed the report, stating, “The greatest untapped markets in 
the world are right here at home, in our distressed communities.”269  
Just like Nixon’s black capitalism, Clinton’s “community capitalism” was a 
bipartisan winner. Missouri Republican Representative James Talent praised the bill 
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as “not only the most comprehensive antipoverty package coming out of the federal 
government . . . in a generation, but it also . . . has assimilated the lessons that 
people on both sides of the aisle have learned over the last generations.”270 Jesse 
Jackson enthusiastically joined Clinton’s community enterprise agenda with his 1998 
“Close the Gaps. Leave No American Behind” campaign. Jackson proposed that 
the president create “vehicles to move capital” into disadvantaged areas. 271  
Clinton’s “community capitalism” program as applied to banks was the Riegle 
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, commonly 
known as the Community Development Banking Act (CDBA).272 The Act provided 
tax incentives for banks, or Community Development Financial Institutions 
(CDFIs), that served disadvantaged areas. 273 According to Clinton, a South Side 
Chicago bank that was putting the theory of community capitalism into practice 
inspired the promulgation of the bill. This bank, called Shorebank, was the country’s 
most famous “black bank,” even though it was not black owned.274 
Shorebank’s motto—”Let’s Change the World”—was not an empty 
marketing pitch. As the exemplar of community capitalism, Shorebank promoted a 
“triple bottom line: profitability, community development impact, and an 
environmental return.”275 Shorebank’s primary aim centered on fighting urban 
decline. At its peak, it had $4.1 billion invested in inner-city Chicago.276 The bank’s 
ambitious mission drew many admirers, including Grameen Bank founder 
Muhammad Yunus, who visited the bank before launching microcredit in 
Bangladesh and receiving a Nobel Peace Prize for his innovative approach to 
poverty.277 
The bank certainly had its struggles, particularly against the same profitability 
trap that had ensnared black banks for nearly a century. For the first decade, the 
bank lost money because its loans were risky, deposits were small, and operation 
costs were high.278 In short, Shorebank’s founders came to the same realization that 
many had reached before them—that operating a profitable bank in a poor and 
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segregated ghetto is a challenge. However, Shorebank enjoyed more outside 
“socially inclined” capital investment than most black-owned banks. For example, 
Shorebank had private funders who “invested with the understanding that the 
primary purpose of their investment is to do development and not maximize return 
on capital.”279 As Governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton visited the bank in 1985 and 
called it “the most important bank in America.” 280 In promoting the Shorebank 
model, Clinton outlined his early vision for community empowerment: 
You have to go into these areas with strategies that enable people to take 
control of their own destiny . . . . We need to create a small-business 
entrepreneurial economy in every underclass urban area and rural area in 
the country through the use of banks like the South Shore Bank, which 
played a major role in revitalizing the South Side of Chicago. To most 
people, “empowerment” sounds like a buzzword, but the truth is that 
America can’t get very far with a dependent or helpless population. Trying 
to create an entrepreneurial economy around a different sort of banking 
system.281 
To President Clinton, a “different sort of banking system” meant one in which 
a community’s banks were “owned and operated by the people who live there.”282 
This philosophy was not new. In fact, it had been the theory of black capitalism all 
along—the premise being that control of banking within a community would lead 
to “empowerment” and economic equality. But, unlike previous administrations, 
Clinton chose to support his vision for community capitalism with actions, such as 
significant tax credits, as opposed to mere rhetoric. 
While on the campaign trail in 1992, Clinton promised to establish one 
hundred banks modeled after Shorebank.283 This promise manifested itself in the 
CDBA, which promised to “promote economic revitalization and community 
development through investment in and assistance to community development 
financial institutions.”284 As required by the Supreme Court, the law was race-
neutral, but its clear mission was to propagate more banks like Shorebank in the 
ghetto. These banks, called CDFIs, were defined as institutions that (1) had “a 
primary mission of promoting community development”; (2) “[served] an 
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investment area or targeted population”; and (3) “provide[d] development services 
in conjunction with equity investments or loans.”285 
This new approach to black banking found proponents across both sides of 
the racial and political spectrum. African American Senator Carol Mosely-Braun 
remarked that the bill “suggests that the financial institutions can do well and do 
good simultaneously . . . that financial institutions can make money by expanding 
credit opportunities to underserved communities.”286 Republican Congressman 
Tom Ridge commented that “communities without credit are very much like land 
without rain, nothing grows.”287 Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy said that “whole 
segments of our people in this country are unfairly denied access to credit, [it is our 
job] to make certain that financial institutions make credit available to all of those 
people who can afford to pay it back.”288 One senator described the present issue 
as “not whether community development banks are a good idea . . . but rather how 
do we establish them . . . .”289 
The central theory behind the CDFIs was that they would discover hidden 
profits in the ghetto. Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers envisioned “[a] 
successful CDFI [as] perhaps best compared to a niche venture capital firm that 
deploys its superior knowledge of an emerging market niche to invest and manage 
risk better than other investors.”290 Summers labeled these banks “market scouts” 
that would seek out profits in overlooked markets. Yet black banks had long been 
attempting to make profits in the ghetto, only to find that the stubborn financial 
landscape of the ghetto economy had always stood in the way, as CDFIs would 
soon learn. As with black banks, CDFIs have struggled to remain profitable despite 
help from the tax code. CDFIs routinely show weaker financial performance across 
the board compared with their more conventional peers.291 Remarkably, minority 
banks have been essentially shut out of the CDFI fund. Since its inception, only 
between 2% and 6% of these funds have been awarded to minority banks.292 The 
 
285. Id. § 4702(5)(A)(i)–(iii). 
286. BARADARAN, supra note 139, at 231. 
287. Id. 
288. Id.  
289. Id.  
290. Lawrence H. Summers, U.S. Sec’y of Treasury, Building Emerging Markets in America’s 
Inner Cities, Remarks to the National Council for Urban Economic Development (Mar. 2, 1998), http:/
/www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2262.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y7Z8-V7TT]. 
291. Lehn Benjamin et al., Community Development Financial Institutions: Current Issues and Future 
Prospects, 26 J. URB. AFF. 177, 189 (2004); Robert Barba & Joe Adler, Resolution Deal Shows ShoreBank 
Was Savvy to the End, AM. BANKER (Aug. 23, 2010), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ 
resolution-deal-shows-shorebank-was-savvy-to-the-end [https://perma.cc/S8Y6-22QN]; Surviving the 
Recession: How Microlenders are Coping with Changing Demand, Risk and Funding, ASPEN INST. (July  
1, 2010), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/surviving-recession-microlenders-coping-
changing-demand-risk-funding/ [https://perma.cc/YYA4-BSH4].  
292. Carolyn M. Brown, Black Banks Shut Out of New Federal Tax Credit Program, BLACK 
ENTERPRISE ( July 15, 2015), https://www.blackenterprise.com/minority-banks-shut-out-of-new-
federal-tax-credit-program/2/[https://perma.cc/8HF9-74LQ](“By our estimates, less than 2% of 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395876
Clean Final Edit_Baradaran.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/18/19  8:43 PM 
2019] JIM CROW CREDIT 149 
issue stems from the Treasury consistently choosing projects that promised more 
profits and had less risk due to its institutional concern of maintaining the fund’s 
profitability. This practice has only exacerbated the profit leakage from segregated 
minority neighborhoods.293  
If the CDFI fund was rooted in the black capitalism model, the CRA was 
rooted in the original affirmative action model. Its justification was to remedy a 
history of discriminatory redlining, and its mission was to require mainstream banks 
to lend a fair portion of their loans to the ghetto. Although redlining had been based 
on explicit racial discrimination, policymakers designed the CRA to be color-blind. 
Much like affirmative action, the act has been one of the most vilified banking laws, 
even as it was criticized by civil rights groups as “toothless” in counteracting the 
legacy of past injustices.294  
In 1977, Senator Proxmire sponsored the bill when he served as chair of the 
Senate Banking Committee. Proxmire had helped pass the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 1975, which had forced banks to divulge loan 
information based on race. Armed with HMDA data that revealed that banks were 
deliberately avoiding making loans in black communities, Proxmire crafted a 
legislative remedy. He reasoned that banks had a duty to remedy the problem 
because they had created it to begin with. He also believed that banks had an 
“obligation to help meet the credit needs” of their local communities.295 He said 
that the CRA was based on the “widely shared assumption” that “a public charter 
conveys numerous economic benefits and in return it is legitimate for public policy 
and regulatory practice to require some public purpose . . . .”296 Proxmire 
acknowledged that banks benefited from a healthy amount of public support. As a 
result, banks, he believed, should serve public needs, or at least not discriminate 
against disadvantaged members of the public. This perspective clashed with the 
prevailing neoliberal market philosophy that held that the only obligations banks 
had were to their shareholders.  
To ensure that banks lent a fair portion of their loans to the ghetto, the bill 
required banks to prepare annual reports describing whether they were meeting the 
credit needs of low- to moderate-income residents. The bill instructed bank 
regulators to rate each bank from “Outstanding” to “Substantial Noncompliance” 
based on the quantity of loans they were issuing in low-income areas.297 The bill did 
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not force banks to lend or open branches in any particular community, but a 
negative CRA rating could be used by a bank regulator to deny a bank’s application 
for merger or any other change that required regulatory approval.298  
When it was introduced, the bill was openly and strongly condemned by many 
bankers and their allies. Republican Senator Phil Graham called the act “an evil like 
slavery in the pre-Civil War era.”299 “It’s unbelievable,” fumed one anonymous 
Southern banker, “[t]hese people are trying to enforce a change in social policy over 
the back of the banking industry.”300 Other opponents raised additional issues with 
the bill. They claimed that the bill clashed with efficient market forces and forced 
banks to make unprofitable loans. This is evidenced by the fact that if the loans 
were profitable, banks would not have needed regulatory nudges to make them.301  
At the other end of the spectrum, community groups have expressed concern 
that the CRA is more geared towards process than real reform.302 Banks, for 
example, receive a rating based on how often they meet with a community group 
rather than on the actual results of those meetings. In addition, loans are measured 
quantitatively, not qualitatively.  
The CRA still finds itself between a group of people who believe it does not 
achieve nearly enough and another group that believe it requires too much.303 As a 
result, the resemblance to affirmative action in college admission is striking. Much 
like affirmative action, there is a perceived feeling that institutions are being forced 
to hire lower-quality employees or make lower-quality loans to appease some vague 
sense of social morality that is not meritocratic and poses unjustified social burdens 
on the bottom line. Detractors of affirmative action argue that schools should only 
select students based on academic merit. Similarly, banks should only lend based on 
profitability. At the core of their argument, critics claim that affirmative action and 
the CRA conflict with a natural meritocracy or an efficient market.  
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Opponents of affirmative action claim that it harms both the school and the 
minority applicant. They reason that the pool of minority applicants performs worse 
than white applicants, and when underperforming minority students gain admission, 
there is a “mismatch” of capacity.304 According to this widely cited “mismatch 
theory,” whites should continue to fill elite universities until blacks catch up 
naturally. Banks often follow a similar line of logic by claiming that they should 
avoid lending into distressed areas. Banks posit that they are not discriminating, but 
rather they are avoiding nonprofitable areas and avoiding riskier loans. Residents of 
these areas are more likely to default on a loan because they have fewer resources. 
Applying the mismatch theory to banking results in the notion that borrowers 
should work to earn bank loans instead of being offered the loans prematurely. This 
mismatch can hurt the bank, society, and the borrower.  
These arguments only touch on surface-level problems and fail to explore why 
black students and black borrowers lag behind whites in the first place. A history 
of segregation explains why the ghetto does not yield profitable loans. More 
specifically, segregation was enacted through lending discrimination perpetuated by 
the very firms now being asked to close the gap. Once the Supreme Court decided 
that past injustice could not be rectified through the law, the nation appeared to 
erase its memory of the past injustice and allow for these types of shortsighted 
arguments in opposition to any program designed to address a historic wrong. The 
long debate over the CRA erupted after the financial crisis, with some even 
implausibly blaming the CRA for precipitating the financial crisis.  
Scholars as well as influential policymakers like the Federal Reserve Chair and 
the Treasury Secretary have debunked the theory that the CRA or government 
mortgage policy led to the financial crisis.305 In fact, every serious and trustworthy 
analysis has concluded that the CRA did not cause the rise in subprime lending. 
Such a theory that the CRA led to the financial crisis is implausible. The Act was 
passed in 1977, and subprime lending began to rise more than twenty years later. 
Also, most of the crisis-causing subprime loans were not made by lenders with any 
CRA obligations. In fact, only 6% of subprime loans were even CRA loans.306 Even 
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so, commentators and politicians continue to blame the one law that was aimed at 
increasing minority lending for the financial crisis. A portion of the public likely still 
believes that blacks and other minorities do not deserve government benefits and 
that they take more than their share. This narrative paints low-income subprime 
borrowers as exploiters of taxpayer money and government largesse.307 It is a 
convenient fiction that protects banks from appropriate regulation and ignores a 
history of injustice. 
Those who espouse this fiction simply do not understand the banking 
industry. 308 In reality, the banks wanted subprime loans because they were making 
unprecedented profits. Subprime lenders appeared in ghettos because they were 
able to convince more people to take out subprime loans in the ghettos, not because 
the government or community activists wanted the subprime lenders there. In fact, 
many activist and consumer groups tried to fight these subprime lenders.309 
 The rise of subprime mortgage lending occurred because banker and 
investor demand increased. Profits drove the narrative. Wall Street banks only 
became interested in this market once subprime loans became profitable. In the 
years preceding the crisis, the subprime market began overheating due to increased 
demand for investments by what economists have labeled a “savings glut.” Foreign 
investors flooded U.S. markets with money. This oversupply of cheap cash lowered 
U.S. Treasury note yields. As a result, the money flowed into the next safest 
investment—asset-backed securities, or home mortgages. To meet the demand, the 
financial sector sold, bundled, insured, and created new “structured products,” and 
then originated more mortgage loans. This demand created the subprime mortgage 
market. The crisis was not created by poor minorities demanding housing loans, but 
by Wall Street demanding more loans and then lobbying for government policies 
that lowered underwriting standards.310 
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THE POOR STILL PAY MORE 
The effects of the segregated debt market can still be felt today and have 
created two separate and unequal systems of banking and credit: the regulated and 
heavily subsidized mainstream banking industry and the unregulated, costly, and 
often predatory fringe industry. Having been left out of the former, the black 
community has historically occupied the latter. This has come at their great expense. 
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler found that on average blacks pay an extra $425 
for a loan than white customers.311  
Most black neighborhoods are “banking deserts,” or neighborhoods 
abandoned by mainstream banks.312 A survey conducted by the FDIC revealed that 
53.6% of blacks are either unbanked or under-banked.313 In striking contrast, only 
3% of whites do not have a bank account and 15% are underbanked. Those without 
bank accounts pay up to 10% of their income or around $2500 per year, just to use 
their money.314 That is a meaningful amount of money for low-income Americans, 
and it is being sucked up by alternative financial services. This problem has only 
worsened since the financial crisis of 2008, when 93% of all bank closings were in 
low-income minority neighborhoods.315 
When banks leave a neighborhood, high cost payday lenders, title lenders, and 
other fringe banks usually fill the void. Once the subprime profits disappeared after 
the crisis, banks began avoiding the ghetto again. By 2016, an investigation of 
mortgage lending in St. Louis found that banks made fewer loans to borrowers in 
black neighborhoods than white ones.316 Moreover, mortgage applicants from 
minority zip codes were denied mortgages at significantly higher rates than 
applicants in white neighborhoods.317  
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In banking deserts, blacks rely disproportionately on payday lenders. In fact, 
the black community is more than twice as likely as any other race to use payday 
loans.318 With such costly credit options, it makes sense that debt collectors extract 
as much as five times more judgements against black neighborhoods than white 
ones. According to two studies conducted between 2015 and 2016, blacks were 
much more likely to be sued by debt collectors than any other racial group. These 
studies showed that this was true even when differences in income were accounted 
for. Specifically, debt collectors sued one in four black residents in the studied 
communities. Most of the other lawsuits were similar: large debt collectors suing for 
small amounts.319 The study found that debt collectors were not intentionally 
discriminating, but that “white consumers are, in general, better able to resolve 
smaller debts.”320 The study confirmed that black communities have less wealth 
than white ones and are thus more vulnerable to hardship.321  
The black community faces two distinct challenges as a result of the racial 
wealth gap. Black families have greater difficulty ascending the economic ladder; it 
also means that it is much easier for these families to fall. Because wealth provides 
a buffer against life’s hardest edges, those without it find themselves exposed to 
devastating financial shocks like bankruptcy, eviction, and apparently lots of 
lawsuits. These lawsuits further increase the financial pressure through wage 
garnishments, aggressive collection practices, and criminal prosecutions. In turn, 
these hardships create a “web of indebtedness,” according to one black resident in 
the study.322 Although a wage garnishment can feel like extortion, creditors are 
increasingly using actual extortion. Often the original debt collector, such as a 
municipality, sells its debts to an underworld of unregulated debt collectors who 
threaten debtors with criminal prosecution in order to intimidate them into paying 
their debts.323 Despite the fact that these threats are often baseless and illegal, the 
unscrupulous bounty hunters continually harass debtors.  
Today, much of the legislation and programs remain the same. Banking 
agencies are still carrying out their FIRREA legislative mandate to support minority 
banks. The MBDP remains, which means that federal agencies and federal grant 
recipients are being encouraged to deposit funds into banks owned or controlled by 
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women or minorities.324 Similarly, the FDIC runs its own minority bank deposit 
program entitled the Minority Depository Institution Program (MDIP).325 The 
MBDA, the successor to the OMBE, is still active and advertises on its website that 
it is “the only federal agency created specifically to foster the establishment and 
growth of minority-owned business in America.”326 Its most advertised feature is a 
website for minority entrepreneurs called the “Minority Business Internet Portal,” 
which is described as “an e-commerce solution designed for the MBE [Minority 
Business Enterprise] community.”327  
In 2007, the Congressional Committee on Financial Services held a hearing to 
assess whether regulatory agencies were meeting the FIRREA mandate of 
“preserving and expanding minority banks.”328 Black bank representatives and top 
agency officials testified about the state of minority banks with a focus on black-
owned banks. An expansive Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
accompanied the hearing.  
Each agency offered its own explanation of how it was working towards the 
FIRREA mandate. The FDIC testified that it was offering “technical assistance” 
and “training and educational programs” to minority banks.329 As for its charge to 
preserve and promote minority banks, it explained that no formal process existed. 
Instead, it made decisions on a case-by-case basis. The Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC) explained that it had held conferences and offered technical 
assistance. It further noted that after periodic bank examinations, the examiners 
contacted minority institutions to “make sure that the institution understands any 
issues or concerns that we have highlighted in the report.”330 Similarly, the OTS 
explained that its program involved technical assistance and education.  
The hearing revealed that the theme of the support being given to black banks 
involved education, guidance, training, and counseling. Apparently, it was not just 
minority subprime borrowers that needed education, but also minority banks. 
Because of Section 308’s vague requirements and a lack of any clear mandate from 
the president or Congress, the regulators have essentially designated themselves as 
high school guidance counselors—available for advice or technical assistance with 
the occasional workshops for good measure.  
Unsurprisingly, the minority banks chose not to rely on their regulators for 
help. In fact, the GAO reported that only 30% of minority banks had used the 
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technical assistance offered by regulators.331 Moreover, no agency had ever assessed 
whether its “assistance” actually helped these banks. The GAO report revealed that 
the agencies had “not undertaken the more difficult and time-consuming, but 
ultimately much more important, task of truly understanding the unique challenges 
these institutions face” or of trying to tailor their “regulations, supervision and 
examinations” to help black banks.332 Notably, less than one-third thought the 
regulators were doing a “very good” or “good” job.333 Robert Cooper, representing 
the National Bankers Association, the main trade group for black-owned banks, put 
it bluntly: “To be honest,” said Cooper, “we have not seen much benefit from 
FIRREA Section 308.”334 Regulators had not applied “any different rules or 
approaches to minority institutions than majority institutions.”335 Regulators were 
just doing the bare minimum required by law, which amounted to “technical 
assistance,” and had “steadfastly refused” to use their power to benefit minority 
banks.336 Unsurprisingly, the regulatory support was a facade as was the premise 
underlying the entire framework.  
Even before the financial crisis wiped out the industry, several government 
studies showed that black banks were lagging significantly behind their peers in 
profitability. According to S&P data, the average median return on equity in 2016 
was 8.04% for the banking industry. For black-owned banks, the median was just 
1.19%.337 Over the course of a century of operation, the reasons black banks 
remained unprofitable had not changed. Cooper told Congress that the biggest 
struggles black banks faced were (1) the economically depressed communities they 
operate in, (2) their need to keep high reserves for losses, (3) higher general expenses 
than other banks, and (4) higher transaction costs because they deal with a higher 
proportion of retail customers on a face-to-face basis.338 The CEO of Liberty Bank, 
one of the largest and most successful black-owned banks, describes his bank’s 
struggle: “[M]y expenses are twice as much because I have to do more counseling 
to my borrower. I may have to have guard service because I am in a high crime area. 
My deposits are much smaller.”339  
It was clear that the black banks knew exactly what their problems were, and 
it was not a lack of technical knowledge. However, just as it is unfair to place the 
burden of the racial wealth gap on black banks, it is unfair to blame bank regulators 
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for not helping enough. The regulators’ sole focus is to manage bank risks. They 
simply do not have the tools, mandate, or even the education to understand and fix 
the unique hardships that black banks face. 
Before the legislature could resolve any of the issues presented at the hearing, 
the 2008 financial crisis rocked the country, particularly the established banking 
regulatory framework. Congress responded with the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. The 
Dodd-Frank Act contained a few provisions centered on minority banks, but they 
were far from robust. The Act ignored almost all of the recommendations that arose 
during the hearings. In fact, Section 367(4)(A) marked the only change to the 
regulatory framework. This section amended Section 308 of FIRREA to apply to 
all the banking agencies, not just the OTS and the FDIC.340 Additionally, Section 
342 of Dodd-Frank required each banking agency to establish an Office of Minority 
and Women Inclusion (OMWI), which was designed to increase diversity of agency 
staff and to offer assistance to minority and women controlled banks. Because of 
Dodd-Frank, every agency now offers technical assistance. However, there are still 
no tax breaks, no help with capital, and no structural reforms. 
TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL REFORM 
Instead of recognizing that white majoritarian institutions have been complicit 
in and even benefited from black America’s poverty, the state has repeatedly placed 
the burden to close the wealth gap on the black community itself. During pivotal 
moments in our nation’s history when the country was in the mood to address racial 
injustices, real economic reform aimed at wealth and land redistribution was 
thwarted in favor of half measures and pseudo-reforms. During Reconstruction, 
instead of the promised forty acres and a mule, the freed slaves got a bank. In order 
to pass his monumental and redistributive New Deal agenda, FDR chose to leave 
blacks out of the bounty in order to get southern Democrat approval of his 
sweeping reforms. Then during the 1960s, when the focus of the black rights 
movement shifted from civil to economic equality, a complex and combustible 
political environment led Richard Nixon to choose black capitalism over housing 
integration. Instead of George Romney’s open communities, Nixon gave black 
banks government agency deposits. Successive administrations discontinued the 
War on Poverty before it could bear fruit and replaced it with a war on crime, drugs, 
and taxes; all of which had devastating effects on the most vulnerable black 
communities. 
These diversions were not always done out of malice. There have been major 
political and social roadblocks to dealing effectively with the wealth gap, and each 
of history’s potential reformers have faced them. The biggest roadblock is inherent 
in majoritarian democracy itself. Once race was used to divide up the population, 
tribalism assured that blacks would always be in the minority. Though America’s 
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constitutional democracy has safeguards for the protection of minorities, there are 
also heavy majoritarian constraints. For example, for nearly a century, the Senate 
was the dam against progress. Even when the dam had been breached, the results 
have fallen short of full justice to blacks. Demands for integration or reparations 
faced vociferous public and electoral opposition because they came at a price. 
Scuttling those claims, legislators pushed forward weak versions of redress like 
affirmative action, which had enough consensus to pass, but would not lead to real 
economic equality. Even those have become lightning rods of political opposition. 
A 2016 study glibly predicted that based on the current racial wealth gap, it 
would take 228 years for blacks to have as much wealth as whites today. The 
prediction is inaccurate on two dimensions.341 If nothing changes, no amount of 
time will close the wealth gap because of the self-perpetuating cycles of poverty and 
lack of wealth. However, heretofore untried changes can close the wealth gap very 
quickly. In 1894, a London newspaper predicted that “in fifty years, every street in 
London will be buried under nine feet of manure.”342 This dire outcome did not 
consider that horses would not be the primary mode of transportation in fifty years 
and that the automobile, an invention that was right around the corner, would 
transform life. Once motivated to deal with the wealth gap, radical solutions may 
emerge. There is no reason to believe that the future is just horse manure—even 
though that is all we have ever used to tackle the racial wealth gap. 
An essential first step in dealing with the wealth gap is to acknowledge that it 
was created through racist public policy. Full justice demands recognition of the 
historic breach of the social contract between America’s constitutional democracy 
and black Americans. And contract breach requires a remedy. Without that 
recognition, the Constitution itself stands as a roadblock to redress because it 
demands that all individuals be neither harmed nor benefited based on group 
characteristics. But it is unfair to be held to a contract that has already been violated. 
Blacks have been harmed in direct contradiction to the Constitution’s promise of 
equal treatment yet they have still had to contend with its demand of equal treatment 
in seeking a remedy.  
There has been a powerful political resistance against any form of 
compensatory damages for past wrongs such as housing integration or reparations. 
But economic equality must proceed down one of those paths.343 It is time to 
confront history directly, to recognize a breach, and provide compensation. The 
United States has not yet formally apologized for slavery or the years of Jim Crow 
laws and segregation. Because it has not done so, that history continues to linger. 
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Not just through the wealth gap, but through continuing racism. Theories of racial 
inferiority were used to justify the injustices of slavery and Jim Crow, and even while 
both of those institutions were defeated, the theories lingered on because they were 
never confronted directly. White supremacy not only lingered, but increased in the 
years after slavery was ended. And a forceful backlash followed the civil rights era 
reforms of the 1960s. American institutions failed to acknowledge that a breach had 
occurred, a breach justified with claims of racial inferiority. The Nuremburg trials 
in Germany and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee allowed these 
countries to confront their racial atrocities forthrightly. Americans of all races would 
be well served through such a public airing. 
There are a few examples of how such a reckoning might take place and what 
it could achieve. In 2016, Georgetown University admitted that it had purchased 
272 slaves in 1838 and promised to give each descendant of these slaves preferred 
treatment in admissions.344 The university is planning a “Mass Reconciliation” 
where it will recognize and apologize for its history. Georgetown’s President, John 
DeGioia, explained, “We cannot do our best work if we refuse to take ownership 
of such a critical part of our history.”345 Another example is tied to private 
companies that benefited financially from the convict labor system. The spoils of 
the system have enriched some of the largest Southern companies, including the 
First Atlanta Bank, which held the fortune of one of the largest convict-slave 
holders in the South, James English. After Wachovia acquired First Atlanta, the 
bank decided to formally recognize its ill-gotten gains. In 2005, Wachovia issued a 
formal apology to “all Americans and especially to African Americans and people 
of African descent” and established a scholarship for minorities.346 Ken Thomas, 
former CEO and white Southerner explained that he was “overwhelmed by the 
emotional impact our apology had for African American employees.”347 After the 
apology and internal group discussions with employees, “workers cried, held hands, 
embraced one another regardless of company rank, and, in an unprecedented way, 
began speaking to one another.”348 A formal apology and a scholarship fund do not 
erase the injustice of the past, but at Wachovia, it led to healing and harmony.  
Beyond a formal apology, however, designing a compensation program would 
present significant practical and legal hurdles. Distinctions based on color or race 
were a fiction to begin with such that trying to use strict racial categories to separate 
people would lead to absurd results. Some modern descendants of slaves would be 
overcompensated, and some would be undercompensated because their racial 
 
344. Rachel L. Swarns, 272 Slaves Were Sold to Save Georgetown: What Does It Owe Their 
Descendants?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2016. 
345. Kathryn Vasel, Georgetown to Offer Slave Descendants Preferential Admission Status, CNN 
(Sept. 1, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/01/pf/college/georgetown-university-slave-
descendants-admissions/index.html [https://perma.cc/E2T4-J5NH]. 
346. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF 
BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 392 (2008). 
347. Id.  
348. Id.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395876
Clean Final Edit_Baradaran.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/18/19  8:43 PM 
160 U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:X 
identity has shifted over time. Moreover, the recently created myth of 
colorblindness is so doggedly defended by the Courts and the American public that 
it would prove difficult to dismantle. These practical and philosophical barriers 
would certainly diminish public support for an already unpopular idea. A 2016 
Marist/PBS poll found that 81% of white Americans opposed reparations for 
slavery. Of blacks, 58 % supported it.349 As Al Brophy explains in Reparations: Pro 
& Con, “[T]he cost of a meaningful program of reparations—and racial justice—
will be colossal, though so will the benefits.”350  
 However, it is possible to avoid the tricky racial identity quagmire and to link 
redress to more recent injustices instead of a historically remote harm like slavery. 
The point of this Article has not been to propose a particular proposal, but rather 
to demonstrate that past efforts have fallen short and that any plan to bridge the 
wealth gap must include integration or a means to acquire capital. Based on these 
findings, there are a few policy designs worth considering. One is to just follow the 
red lines and focus on home ownership. Most of the neighborhoods that were 
initially redlined in 1934 have been perpetually denied credit and thus remain 
pockets of poverty. Racial ghettos, once created, have had remarkable staying 
power. Across the country, these black ghettos are still the territories where the 
wealth and well-being gap are most drastically highlighted. These are the districts 
where poverty is still concentrated, schools are segregated, and properties continue 
to be devalued. By focusing a reparations program on geography as opposed to 
identity, policymakers can not only avoid the sacred cow of colorblindness, but they 
can link reparations with integration. 
Moreover, a program focused on home ownership or mortgage credit instead 
of a cash payment, which is how reparations have typically been conceived, will 
likely yield better outcomes both in garnering public support and in effectively 
breaking the intergenerational wealth gap. A cash transfer might lead to a positive 
outcome for the generation that receives it, but only if that generation uses it as an 
investment yielding future benefits. Home and land ownership, on the other hand, 
have the potential to lead to long-term intergenerational benefits as the home and 
land get passed down. A home can also be used as collateral for other life-enhancing 
loans, like consumer or student loans. There is a historic precedent for such a 
program. Because land grants and mortgage subsidies were the process through 
which white Americans gained a wealth advantage over black Americans, there is 
every reason to use land or mortgages as a program that would level the playing 
field.  
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Through a process called “greenlining,” public and private funds could be 
deployed to spur wealth creation among individuals and communities. In the same 
way that FHA loan guarantees spurred a robust mortgage market, greenlining can 
lower the cost of mortgage lending. This can be done through a variety of financial 
mechanisms. In the most direct analogy to previous FHA programs, HUD, in 
conjunction with the GSE’s, would guarantee mortgages through participating 
banks. Banks would issue the loan, which would be guaranteed against default by 
the federal government. Unlike the subprime mortgage lending preceding the crisis, 
these loans would be priced according to their risk, which would be very small due 
to the government guarantee. These loans would have to be made available to 
current residents of the area so as to not displace residents and induce outsiders to 
take advantage of the guarantees. In the event of loan default, the government 
would suffer the risk of losses of these mortgages, however.  
Another option with even lower costs or risks to the government is to offer 
“shared equity mortgages” (SEMs) or “shared appreciation mortgages,” a hybrid 
debt/equity mortgage. The essential structure is that an investor together with a 
borrower own a property jointly. A borrower who might not be able to come up 
with a down payment on her own would enter into a joint mortgage agreement with 
either a private investor (a bank or a non-profit) or a public investor (like federal, 
state, or local government fund) who would supply the down payment. The 
borrower who occupied the property would make mortgage payments instead of 
monthly rental payments. At the end of the mortgage cycle or upon sale, the equity 
would be split between the investor and the borrower. In case of borrower default, 
the investor could take possession of the home and the debt. All equity retrieved 
from a home sale or even a foreclosure would be split evenly between the parties. 
This arrangement would allow low-income individuals who otherwise could not 
own a home to own half of the value of a home and begin to accrue wealth. 
Investors would be protected from the downside because they own the property as 
a joint tenant, which means that they own it in full if the borrower stops paying the 
mortgage payments.  
One important benefit of an SEM in green-lined areas would be that it would 
provide an incentive for the investing partner, either a non-profit, bank, or 
government agency, to make sure that the property appreciated in value. Property 
values rise when schools, parks, public facilities, and other indicators of community 
health improve. Research and history show that when individuals own their homes, 
they are more invested in their community. This double investment would link 
individuals, private corporations, non-profits, and government entities in improving 
neighborhoods unlike the subprime lenders or contract sellers whose main 
motivation was one-time profits. 
One problem in the above programs is that neighborhoods remain racially 
segregated at least until the wealth gap begins to disappear. One option to disrupt 
segregation is a housing voucher program, which has been tested by some 
municipalities. In its current form, these vouchers have only applied to rental 
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properties or Section 8 housing. However, in order to build wealth, these vouchers 
would need to be tied to a wealth-creating property. Vouchers could take the form 
of an SEM arrangement and the borrower could choose a home in any 
neighborhood. The focus is to reverse blighted communities stuck in cycles of 
poverty due to segregation. These trends can change by upsetting racial segregation 
patterns or by enriching the residents of the urban ghetto so they themselves can 
choose to move out while others move in. To maintain racial neutrality in vouchers, 
the program would focus on residents of formerly redlined areas. Another selection 
possibility is to create criteria based on a mix of factors aimed at selecting individuals 
of any race, but who meet an income threshold and are below an asset and income 
maximum. In other words, any individual would qualify for a voucher so long as 
they had sufficient income to make a modest mortgage payment but had income 
below the national average. This casts the net much wider and would therefore be 
more expensive, but such is the cost of demanding colorblindness. 
Public institutions could also deliver these loans directly. For example, instead 
of using banks or investors as middlemen, federal, state, or local funds could be 
used to lend into these areas with the profits returning to the public treasury instead 
of being shared by the bank. A state or municipality can even establish a public bank 
for this purpose. North Dakota has a public state bank, and one of its most 
successful functions has been to offer credit to regions of the state that private 
banks have neglected, such as with rural mortgages.351 Public banking actually works 
best when there is a well-defined mission that the market is not meeting. This has 
been the model for development banks abroad as well as our own historic GSE’s, 
FHA lending programs, postal banking operations, and even federally backed funds 
like the FDIC and the Federal Reserve that have stepped in to fill a void created by 
the private market. Indeed, it would be fitting for a quasi-public entity like the FHA 
to be created to fix the problem the FHA itself created.  
The drawback of all of these plans is that they attempt to break the cycle of 
poverty, unemployment, and community decline through mortgage debt. This is 
what the FHA did after the Great Depression and it yielded the desired results, but 
can mortgages lead to prosperity today? Credit today is not what credit was in post-
war America. In a growing and dynamic economy, credit meant wealth creation. 
Prominent economist Robert Gordon has made the case that America is headed 
toward an era of stagnant growth, which could mean that it would be unwise to 
attempt to create wealth through mortgage debt without changing the fundamental 
structure of the economy. If a program only increases debt without adding 
opportunities, such as increased incomes and wealth generation through property 
appreciation, the expected gains will not be realized. However, there is reason to 
believe that some of this stagnant growth can be remedied by focusing on inequality. 
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In other words, by bringing back the New Deal era ethos of a mixed economy, or 
a government-private partnership, the economy can be spurred toward creation. 
Dealing with inequality can have trickle-up effects and raise all boats. 352 
The assumption on which all of these schemes are based is that the home 
would increase in value. This has not been the case with black homes. This is what 
led Emory professor Dorothy Brown to suggest that blacks avoid purchasing homes 
and instead focus on building wealth through stock ownership. She argued that 
black homes have not increased in value and so homeownership has been a drain 
on black wealth. She suggested that even though stocks may be riskier than 
property, for blacks, they were a safer long-term investment.353 This sound advice 
was the best indictment of the home value gap in America today.  
However, there is reason to believe that homeownership can still create wealth. 
Despite occasional asset bubbles, home values have continued their steady rise in 
America.354 Further, home prices follow a positive feedback loop such that the more 
people own homes in a community, the more home values rise across the board, 
creating more wealth. Higher wealth then leads to a bigger tax base, which leads to 
better schools, which in turn lead to higher incomes down the road. Children who 
grow up in communities of homeowners have better outcomes across the board. 
Thus, the cycle is reversed. In addition, there is reason to believe that racism has 
diminished enough such that black properties would not force a decline on 
neighborhood values. 
We decidedly do not live in a post-racial society, but it is important to step 
back and note the undeniable progress in social, scientific, and political thought. 
Take the case of interracial marriage. Fears of miscegenation were the backdrop to 
the Jim Crow framework and the fuel that fed much of the violence toward black 
men. In 1958, only 4% of Americans approved of interracial marriage. By 2013, a 
Gallup poll found that 87% of Americans approve.355 Having mapped the human 
genome, modern science has now fully dispelled the myth that race is a meaningful 
 
352. GORDON, supra note 85 (explaining that global inequality will continue to push against 
growth); Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded Age, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 8, 2014; see also JACOB 
S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, AMERICAN AMNESIA: HOW THE WAR ON GOVERNMENT LED US TO 
FORGET WHAT MADE AMERICA PROSPER (2016); PIKETTY, supra note 85; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Inequality 
and Economic Growth, 86 POL. Q. 134 (2015); Paul Krugman, Is Vast Inequality Necessary?, N.Y. TIMES 
( Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/opinion/is-vast-inequality-necessary.html 
[https://perma.cc/PZY8-P7JQ]. 
353. Dorothy Brown, How Home Ownership Keeps Blacks Poorer than Whites, FORBES  
(Dec. 10, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/12/10/how-home-
ownership-keeps-blacks-poorer-than-whites/#79868cca4cce [https://perma.cc/ZVN8-EAZ3].  
354. Ilyce Glink, 9 Real Estate Trends to Expect in 2017, CBS NEWS (Dec. 19, 2016),  
https://www.cbsnews.com/media/9-real-estate-trends-to-expect-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4KZU-SX79]. 
355. Frank Newport, In U.S., 87% Approve of Black-White Marriage vs. 4% in 1958, GALLUP, 
July 25, 2013. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395876
Clean Final Edit_Baradaran.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/18/19  8:43 PM 
164 U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:X 
genetic trait.356 Race has never been a biological fact, but only a political weapon, 
and that knowledge will soon change public hearts and minds. Politically, Americans 
are much more tolerant and pluralistic. The majority of the American public also 
elected Barack Obama to office twice. Putting aside the ugly racist backlash 
engendered by his presidency, a black president would not have been possible in 
any previous era. 
We have made strides in recognizing the humanity of others, which only 
improves our own humanity. Slavery was possible for so long because whites 
refused to acknowledge the humanity of their black slaves. In earlier eras, whites 
could push blacks and other immigrants into ghettos and ignore the disease, squalor, 
and poverty that resulted—sometimes even using the inevitable decrepitude of the 
ghetto to justify further dehumanization of minorities.357 As a society, we can no 
longer tolerate this—if only because our digital interconnectedness means we can 
no longer ignore the suffering of others. When images surface of white officers 
killing unarmed black men, the world sees it immediately and the injustice is difficult 
to ignore.  
It is easy, however, to ignore signs of racial progress. Behavioral economists 
speak of an availability heuristic, which means that when people are asked their 
views on a particular issue, they usually use a mental shortcut that over-relies on 
immediate and available examples instead of a full range of available information. 
This cognitive gap, along with the human mind’s well-documented tendency to 
focus on the negative and threatening instead of the positive and mundane, can lead 
many people to believe that racism is as bad today as it has ever been. Indeed, the 
majority of the population believes that racism is as bad or worse today than it was 
twenty years ago.358 Perhaps this is because the first available images that come to 
mind when we consider race relations are the most salient: police brutality, racist 
internet memes or tweets, race riots, hate crimes, or pictures of police marching into 
American cities with military grade weapons. But taking a long historical view, 
research shows that human history has thus far been a steady march toward more 
justice and more peace with some marked outliers that catch more light than they 
should. Indeed, the moral arch of the universe does seem to bend toward justice, 
often in a way that is hard to detect and sometimes taking some very tortuous 
detours. However, we are less violent, more compassionate, and more tolerant on 
the whole than we have been at any point in history.  
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Racism is not only harmful to blacks, but it is a corrosive influence on white 
culture. Frederick Douglass explained that he watched as his white mistress change 
as she became a slave master. Her ownership of a human being warped and 
corrupted her previously decent character and turned her into hateful  
person.359 C. Vann Woodward described how the South lost its soul in its obsessive 
and pervasive enforcement of Jim Crow.360 James Baldwin worried about “the death 
of the heart” that racism had wrought on American culture for “whoever debases 
others is debasing himself.”361 Baldwin also understood that the “future of the negro 
in this country is precisely as bright or as dark as the future of the country.”362 The 
sooner Americans recognize that the fate of black America is tied to the fate of 
white America, the faster it can achieve true democracy and shed the weight of 
historic injustices.  
Americans must decide whether to keep embracing our history of racial 
tribalism or to shed these divisions and go forward as one people, indivisible. Can 
America’s majoritarian democracy support a program intended solely to benefit the 
black minority? It certainly did not in 1870, 1930, or 1960. However, there is reason 
to hope that this is more likely now than ever. We are facing another pivot point. 
The racial détente of the 1960s has fallen apart. The myth of post-racial America 
has been dispelled and renewed tensions have erupted on the national stage as well 
as in segregated pockets of poverty in America.  
Modernity will inevitably bring us closer together, which can either lead to 
greater resentment or greater cooperation. Perhaps more people will realize that 
what benefits a minority will also benefit the majority. Full racial integration will 
eventually remove pockets of blight, crime, and deprivation across the country. This 
will benefit the entire American population. Integrated schools benefit all students 
and increased equality will spur economic growth.363 We must shed these 
destructive myths that separate can be equal, that a segregated economy will reach 
prosperity on its own, or that black banks can lead to black prosperity without 
fundamental economic changes. We cannot deflect the responsibility of economic 
equality onto these communities alone. W.E.B Dubois declared in 1948 that the 
great problem of American democracy was that “it had not yet been tried.”364 
Perhaps it is time to try. 
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